The Post has an oped by Edward Schumacher touting the benefits that undocumented workers have provided for the Social Security system. Many pay taxes without ever collecting benefits.
While his numbers don't seem quite right (he claims that annual payouts would exceed tax revenue over the years 2011-2015 without the $12 billion estimated net contribution from undocumented workers, the trustees report shows taxes exceeded benefits by more than $15 billion in the years 2012-2014), the more important problem is with his logic.
Presumably the point of immigration reform measures would be to normalize the employment situation of immigrants so that the workers who are here are on the books, both paying required taxes and receiving the benefits to which they are entitled, like Social Security. If immigrants get the benefits to which they are entitled, then it will make the finances of Social Security somewhat worse.
In reality this is a trivial issue for the program, which is fully solvent for the next 29 years according to the Congressional Budget Office. An increase in the payroll tax of 0.16 percentage points would fully offset the cost of the payment of benefits to undocumented workers. However, it seems bizarre to advocate that immigrants be brought into the country to pay taxes to a program from which they get no benefit, as Mr. Schumacher seems to be doing.
Since reporters feel the need to report nonsense from the Fed chairman without presenting anyone pointing out the obvious, BTP will fill the gap. The NYT reported on Ben Bernanke's testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.
It notes Bernanke's statement that in 2003-2004 it was not clear that the housing market was in a bubble and that by the time it was clear, it was too late for the Fed to do anything without seriously harming the economy. Of course it was clear as early as 2002 that the housing market was in a bubble, but more importantly, Bernanke's claim that the Fed could not act until it was clear is absurd.
The Fed always acts in an uncertain environment. For example, Alan Greenspan raised interest rates in anticipation of inflation on numerous occasions. The logic of this action was that it was worth slowing the economy and raising the unemployment rate rather than risk an increase in the rate of inflation. In effect, this action assumes that the certainty of higher unemployment from raising interest rates is better than the risk of higher inflation.
Had the Fed acted to burst the bubble in 2003-2004, the risk would have been that it temporarily depressed house prices by scaring people about excessive prices and limiting the exotic mortgages that were boosting demand. By contrast, if it had acted correctly in preventing the growth of a dangerous bubble, it would have prevented the worst downturn in 70 years.
Any serious weighing of the benefits and risks of bursting the bubble in 2003-2004 would have surely come down in favor of bursting the bubble. The Fed's decision not to burst the bubble was one of the most disastrous failures of monetary policy in history.
The NYT has long opposed agricultural price support programs. Ironically it supports house price support programs. It seems to want the Obama administration to take further steps to keep the housing bubble from deflating.
The basic story is that house prices are still 15-20 percent above their trend level. These prices seem relatively affordable given the extraordinarily low interest rates in the market at present. However, if we think that interest rates are a major determinant of price, then we must believe that prices will plummet if interest rates return to a more normal level.
Sound housing policy would accept the fall and focus on helping homeowners facing the loss of their home. It would not try to perpetuate the bubble.
Economics isn't that hard, but David Brooks seems to have trouble with it. He thinks everything would have been different if President Obama had pushed through a $713 billion stimulus that was centered on cutting the payroll tax, had pushed through an infrastructure bank instead of his pork barrel projects, and had focused on getting an energy bill rather than a health care bill.
There is no way of knowing how the politics would have played out, but in terms of the economics, it is difficult to see how Brooks' stimulus would have left us in a different place than the Obama stimulus. With stimulus, size does matter, and Brooks is basically talking about a stimulus of roughly the same size as the one President Obama got through Congress.
Payroll tax cuts are relatively progressive (the tax is regressive), so a cut has a fairly high multiplier since most of the money will be spent. Mark Zandi estimates the multiplier on these cuts at 1.3. This is better than for most tax cuts, but less than the 1.7 multiplier estimated for food stamps, the 1.6 for unemployment insurance benefits or infrastructure spending and the same as the 1.3 estimated for aid to state and local government.
This means that if we compare David Brooks stimulus with President Obama's stimulus of roughly the same size, we should expect it to have roughly the same impact on the economy. President Obama's stimulus included some items that would be expected to have more impact (UI benefits and food stamps), and some that would have about the same impact (aid to the states and his own payroll tax cut, which was called "Make Work Pay"), and some that would have less impact if we include the alternative minimum tax fix as part of the stimulus.
As a result, if President Obama had done the David Brooks stimulus we should expect the unemployment rate to be around 9.5 percent, rising to 9.8 percent this morning, and headed to above 10.0 percent by the end of the year. I can't answer whether this would have made President Obama more popular than he is now.
The Post seems to be claiming otherwise in an article that begins with the sentence: "will the U.S. government ever default?" The Washington Post editorial section has been near hysterical in its screaming about budget deficits for most of the last decade. In fact, it was so out of bounds in its rants that it found no space in either its news or opinion section for warnings about the $8 trillion housing bubble. Of course the collapse of this bubble led to the worst economic downturn in 70 years -- and sent the deficit soaring.
It is also worth noting that IMF completely missed the housing bubble and failed to warn of the imminent danger that it posed to the United States and other countries. No one at the IMF was fired over this failure and there has been no major restructuring of its staff, so there is little reason to believe that its understanding of economics is any better or its advice more accurate today than it was in the years before the bubble burst.
Of course the basic hypothesis is silly on its face since the United States issues debt in dollars. It can print as many dollars as it needs to pay off its debt. This could create a risk of inflation, but it rules out the possibility of default. Serious economists and reporters understand this simple point.
Apparently word of CBO's existence has not made its way to Fox on 15th Street. How else can we explain the Post's failure to mention CBO's analysis of the impact of the stimulus in an article reporting on a speech by Christine Romer, President Obama's departing chief economist?
The article reported Romer's view that the stimulus helped keep the economy from sliding into a depression and that additional stimulus would boost growth. It then tells readers that Republicans oppose additional stimulus and "argue that Democrats have run up record budget deficits without improving the economy."
This is where a serious newspaper would report the assessment of the stimulus by independent analysts, most obviously CBO. In an analysis released last month CBO estimated that the stimulus increased output by between 1.7 percent and 4.5 percent. It also calculated that the stimulus lowered the unemployment rate by between 0.8 and 1.7 percentage points. In other words, the CBO estimates imply that unemployment would be between 10.3 percent and 11.2 percent today without the stimulus. This would have been useful information to provide readers.
The NYT reports on a new set of papers from the IMF, one of which warns that many wealthy countries, including the United States, are very close to the limit of their ability to increase their national debt. It is worth noting that this paper's methodology indicated that Japan and Italy were already well above the limit of their ability to take on debt.
The financial markets apparently assess the situation differently than the IMF since both countries are still able to issue long-term debt at very low interest rates. The fact that the methodology is apparently quite wrong in predicting the situations faced by these two countries might suggest that it is not a very useful methodology for guiding U.S. policy.
It is also worth noting that IMF somehow did not see the $8 trillion housing bubble that wrecked the U.S. economy, nor the bubbles in Spain, Ireland, and the U.K. There have been no obvious changes in the IMF's structure that would lead one to believe that it is better at assessing economic prospects today than it was three years ago.
Fool or Liar? That is the question that should be posed of anyone who says that companies are not hiring because of concerns about taxes or regulations.
Exhibit A, the only one necessary to prove the case, is that there has been no unusual increase in average weekly hours. There is some uptick from the low-point of the downturn, but nothing unusual for an upturn, and we are still far below average weekly hours from before the recession.
The first sentence of a Washington Post article on the decision by the SEC not to pursue legal action against the company told readers that the rating agency "misjudged" many securities that subsequently plunged in value. This assertion is exactly what is in dispute.
The rating agency clearly mis-rated many securities, giving investment grade ratings to issues that were clearly junk, at least in retrospect. The question is whether the erroneous ratings were honest mistakes -- misjudgements -- or whether they were due to fact that Moody's knew that issuers wanted investment grade ratings and would not hire them in the future if they could not be relied upon to produce such ratings. The Post has somewhere determined that Moody's just made honest mistakes and told readers so in the very first sentence.
This would no doubt be how the Washington Post's economic reporters would have covered the World Cup final. They would not have bothered to tell readers that Spain in fact did win the World Cup, regardless of what the Netherlands' fans claim.
This comes up in the context of the impact of the stimulus where the Post treats us to a he said/ she said. The Post has a quote from an economist at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities who says the stimulus was a good idea and helped the economy. It also features a quote from an economist at the CATO Institute who says that it didn't help the economy and just added to the debt.
Maybe we could check with the ref. The Congressional Budget Office says it increased GDP by between 1.7 percent and 4.5 percent. They also calculate that it reduced the unemployment rate by between 0.7 and 1.8 percentage points. Private forecasters, such as McCain economic adviser mark Zandi, come up with similar estimates. This would have been useful information to include in this article.
This time it is in UK. It begins an otherwise good article about how proposed budget cuts will disproportionately hit women with the line: "as Britain prepares for the deepest budget cuts in generations to tackle a crippling mound of public debt."
How has it been determined that Britain faces a "crippling mound" of public debt? Certainly the markets have not made this determination since they are still willing to lend money to the UK at very low interest rates. This is simply the view of the writer and or editor, not a fact in the world.
A real newspaper would write: "as Britain prepares for the deepest budget cuts in generations to reduce its public debt." This increases accuracy and saves words.
Mr. Sorkin noted Wall Street's shift of funding to Republicans and told readers that:
"Mr. Loeb’s views, irrespective of their validity, point to a bigger problem for the economy: If business leaders have a such a distrust of government, they won’t invest in the country. And perception is becoming reality."
Is that so? Well, business leaders were never more angry at the government than during Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. And, let's see what they did in those years. Here are the growth rates for non-residential fixed investment in the first four years of the New Deal.
It looks like the business leaders were able to put their anger aside and invest where it was profitable. Of course business leaders always stand to gain if they convince the public of the argument that Mr. Sorkin is making -- if the government doesn't give them everything they want then they won't invest. However, the evidence does not seem to support Mr. Sorkin's assertion.
The Washington Post told readers that the Korean trade pact would raise the price of hogs by $10 each, roughly a 20 percent increase. The context was a claim that the pact would be very important to Indiana farmers. If this is true, then it implies that the Korean trade pact will put serious upward pressure on food prices in the United States.
It is extremely unlikely that more open agricultural trade with a relatively small market could have such a dramatic impact on farm prices. More likely, it is one of the nonsense stories that proponents of trade pacts routinely circulate with the expectation that news outlets like the Washington Post will repeat them unquestioningly. Of course a serious newspaper would point out the implications of such a claim, if it were true.
Robert Samuelson seems to think that the problem with the recovery is that people are still saving. While this is in part right, Normal 0 he is wrong to suggest that anyone should be surprised by the current level of saving.
The current saving rate is approximately 6 percent of disposable income. While Samuelson implies this is high, it is actually very low by historic standards. The saving rate averaged more than 8 percent through most of the post-war era until the wealth effect of the stock and housing bubbles drove it toward zero in the last 15 years.
Samuelson seems to think that after a couple of years of a 6 percent saving rate, saving will again fall to its bubble levels of near zero. There is no reason to expect this. As the housing bubble deflates further, households will see a further decline in wealth. They will likely increase their saving rate to the 8 percent pre-bubble range.
In fact, demographics suggest that the saving rate could rise even higher. The huge baby boom cohort is at the edge of retirement, with most having almost nothing other than their Social Security to depend upon. This provides a strong incentive to save, especially in an environment where much of the political leadership is pushing for cuts to Social Security.
This fact would be worth mentioning in an article that discusses Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke's attitude toward the deficit. If Greenspan and Bernanke (who was a Fed governor from 2002) had paid attention to the $8 trillion housing bubble, and prevented it from growing to the point where it could do so much damage, then the country would not be in a serious downturn today, and we would not be running a large budget deficit.
It is only due to the incompetence of the people running the Fed that we are facing such severe economic problems. In other lines of work, like dishwashers and custodians, people would be fired for such incompetence, but those running the Fed are not held accountable in the same way as most workers.
Why is it so hard for reporters to understand the idea of purchasing power parity? This is important if anyone is interested in understanding China's importance in the world economy. China produces and consumes more output in a wide variety of goods and services. This would not make sense for an economy that is just passing the size of Japan, putting China's economy at a bit more than one-third the size of the U.S. economy.
The more realistic measure is the purchasing power parity measure that puts China's economy at almost two-thirds of the size of the U.S. economy. This measure applies a common set of prices to all goods and services, regardless of which country they are produced in. This measure of China's GDP is far more consistent with a country that both buys and produces more cars than the United States, has more Internet users and twice as many cell phones users.
The NYT told readers that the Fed's ability to take steps to boost the economy are limited because:
"The dramatic expansion of the national debt — which began in the Bush administration, via hefty tax cuts and two wars — has ratcheted up fears that, one day, creditors like China and Japan might demand sharply higher interest rates to finance American spending."
It may be true that such "fears" may prevent the steps to raise employment in the same way that children fear monsters in the dark, and therefore feel the need to keep the light on when they sleep, but reporters should also point out that such fears have no basis in reality. If China and Japan "demand sharply higher interest rates," then it would mean that the dollar would fall sharply against their currencies.
This is exactly the policy that the Obama administration is ostensibly committed to. The lower value of the dollar would lead to a sharp boost to U.S. exports and a fall in imports, lifting growth and employment. It is difficult to understand why anyone would fear the outcome that we are ostensibly committed to seeing. In short, the "fears" have no basis in reality and are promoted either out of ignorance or by people who have ulterior motives.
At one point the article tells readers that Germany has done relatively well in this downturn without using stimulus:
"Germany, which has long harbored particularly powerful fears of inflation, has done relatively well in the current downturn without large stimulus spending, and that experience is now cited by adherents of austerity."
Dishonest adherents of austerity do cite this experience, but it is easy to show that the Germany history does not support their case. According to the OECD, government consumption expenditures increased more in Germany since the downturn than in the United States.
It is worth noting that Germany should have an easier time recovering from this downturn since its economy was not driven by a housing bubble. The main impact on Germany's economy has been through a decline in exports.
It would have been useful if this article had included the views of some economists who were able to see the $8 trillion housing, the collapse of which led to the downturn.
The economists and central bankers attending the annual meeting of central bankers in Jackson Hole, Wyoming apparently have not noticed the collapse of the housing bubble and the wreckage it has caused. This is the only plausible explanation for a WSJ article that told readers about a paper on a new approach to fiscal policy that argues:
"fiscal policy could benefit from the more scientific approach taken by monetary policy over the past two decades."
The article continues:
"The former U.S. Federal Reserve economist [the person presenting the paper] noted how monetary policy has improved after central banks started to adopt goals such as inflation targeting and as central bankers started to articulate the 'science' in public speeches."
People who pay attention to the economy know that the monetary policy pursued over the last three decades has devastated the economy, leaving tens of millions of workers in the United States unemployed or underemployed. It would be hard to imagine a policy that could produce more disastrous results than the single-minded focus on inflation that central banks followed even as housing bubbles in the U.S. and elsewhere grew to ever more dangerous levels.
If the central bankers and economists at Jackson Hole still don't understand how harmful these policies have been then it should raise enormous concern in Congress and among the general public about the competence of the people controlling economic policy. This should have been the main focus of a news article on the meetings.
The Washington Post's lead editorial told readers that there is not much the Fed or anyone else can do to get us out of an economic situation with near double-digit unemployment. It concludes its piece with a vague set of policy recommendations that include "education, tax reform and entitlement reform."
This is pretty much the same agenda that the Post was pushing back in 2002-2007 when others were warning about the dangers of the housing bubble. The Post had no room on its news or opinion pages for these warnings. It seems that it still doesn't. Its policy prescriptions are remarkably impervious to evidence or changed circumstances.