|
The NYT featured a bizarre column today by a family farmer who expressed concern that financial reform will drive speculators from the grain market. The column tells readers:
"According to the trading commission, about one-third of the long positions in hard red spring wheat futures, which is what I trade on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, are owned by speculators. If speculators were driven out of the market, it would be as if I’d lost a third of my customers."
No, that is not quite right. Speculators may buy one-third of the wheat sold on the market, but unlike other customers, they don't keep it. Instead, they resell it. So, if speculators are driven from the market, it would be comparable to eliminating one-third of the buyers and one-third of the sellers, leaving prices on average unchanged.
The profit of speculators come at the expense of sellers and consumers. This may be an acceptable price, if they lend stability to the market. In effect, speculators can absorb the risk of price swings. However, there are reasons to believe that they can also contribute to price swings, making the market less stable. If this is the case, then their profits are a pure loss to the economy. It is also possible that the volume of speculation in the market far exceeds what would be necessary to stabilize prices. In this case the excess speculation would be a drain on the economy.
(Only one link allowed per comment)
 |
However, my surprise was based on the disingenuous way in which the author misused the concepts of derivatives, futures and swaps. All swaps and futures are derivatives, but futures are not swaps, and swaps of course are not futures.
The CFTC already does a proper job in regulating agricultural and other commodity futures markets. There is no provision in the new legislation to impede the activities of speculators in such markets, who indeed are needed to provide liquidity. The CFTC has the existing authority to ensure that speculators do not take excess positions or engage in any improper trading to manipulate or corner such markets.
The regulation of swaps is intended to make those markets MORE like the properly functioning futures markets which the author of the column rightly defnds. Credit default swaps will be traded on organized exchanges, and the risk of counterparty default will be eliminated by the intermediation of a clearing organization -- again, just as in the futures markets.
Does the Times even run these pieces by their business editors who might know something about these issues?