Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch is a blog that tracks multinational aid efforts in Haiti with an eye towards ensuring they are oriented towards the needs of the Haitian people, and that aid is not used to undermine Haitians' right to self-determination.
On November 26, 2020, the Haitian government published two decrees on national security. The first creates a new national intelligence agency, while the second greatly expands the definition of terrorism. Haitian president Jovenel Moise has been ruling by decree since January when the terms of parliament expired, and has used that power to consolidate the strength of the executive branch. The government has framed the changes as a response to recently increasing insecurity, however the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and various human rights organizations have denounced the new decrees and warned that they could be used to increase repression.
Marie Suzy Legros, the head of the bar association, labeled the decrees as “tyrannical” and as the destruction of liberty. “Jovenel Moise has the madness of a dictator,” former Senator Steven Benoit commented in response to the decrees. “He does not realize that we are no longer in 1957,” he continued, in reference to Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier who created his own intelligence agency in the early years of the dictatorship. Even before these recent decrees, 11 human rights organizations had condemned the “dictatorial and unconstitutional” actions of the current administration.
On December 12, the Core Group in Haiti issued a press release “expressing concern” over the new decrees. The Decree on the Strengthening of Public Security, the diplomatic representatives note, “extends the qualification of ‘terrorist act’ to certain facts that do not fall under it and provides for particularly heavy penalties.” The intelligence agency, the Core Group, continued, gives “the agents of this institution virtual legal immunity, thus opening up the possibility of abuse.” Taken together, these decrees “do not seem to conform to certain fundamental principles of democracy, the rule of law and the civil and political rights of citizens.”
So, what is in these new decrees?
A New Intelligence Agency
The National Intelligence Agency (ANI by its French acronym) is a technical and administrative institution, whose primary focus is on information gathering and the repression of hostile acts that could be perceived as a threat to national security. Though the new agency will operate under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, the president has the sole authority to name a director general and other high-level positions (Art. 54).
The ANI will be staffed by individuals recruited from the National Police Academy and from the military. The decree includes scant information on the vetting of ANI officers, but notes that recruits will be subject to testing as well as to psychological and moral inquiries (Art. 32). The officers, whose identities will remain anonymous due to national security concerns, will also be armed (Art. 51) . The decree also grants total secrecy to the ANI’s operations. The ANI is authorized to conduct surveillance and will have access to all relevant government databases. Officers will also be able to enter private homes or businesses at any time in order to access documents, objects, or anything else relevant to an ongoing investigation (Art. 55).
ANI officers will not be regular civil servants, but instead will hold a special status, de facto creating a third armed force in the country (Art. 33). The decree also grants legal protection to all ANI officers (Art. 49). There is no possibility for legal recourse in the case of abuse without prior authorization from the president. The agency itself is protected from any legal action that seeks to prevent its functioning or the execution of its activities (Art. 67). The decree offers relatively little information as to how this new agency might be funded.
An Expanded Definition of Terrorism
The Decree for the Reinforcement of Public Security expands the definition of “terrorism” to include such acts as robbery, extortion, arson, and the destruction or degradation of public and private goods.
Articles 1.12 and 1.13, however, go even further and specify that acts of crowding or blocking public roads to obstruct movement are included in this expanded definition. The decree specifies that even so much as placing garbage in a public road would fall under the new definition of terrorism. Blocking roads is a common protest tactic in Haiti, as in many other countries.
The decree also specifics penalties under the new definition. Those found guilty of committing “terrorist acts” can spend from 30 to 50 years in prison and face a fine ranging from two million to two-hundred million Haitian gourdes (about $28,000 – $2,800,000 at today’s exchange rate). The decree states that the penalties cannot be lowered under any circumstance. Individuals can be exempted from punishment if they provide the authorities with information that prevents a terrorist act and leads to the arrest of the individuals or groups responsible.
Oddly, the decree states that, if there are any reservations, the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate has 30 days to introduce a new law in parliament. The parliament has not functioned since January 2020.
On November 26, 2020, the Haitian government published two decrees on national security. The first creates a new national intelligence agency, while the second greatly expands the definition of terrorism. Haitian president Jovenel Moise has been ruling by decree since January when the terms of parliament expired, and has used that power to consolidate the strength of the executive branch. The government has framed the changes as a response to recently increasing insecurity, however the Port-au-Prince Bar Association and various human rights organizations have denounced the new decrees and warned that they could be used to increase repression.
Marie Suzy Legros, the head of the bar association, labeled the decrees as “tyrannical” and as the destruction of liberty. “Jovenel Moise has the madness of a dictator,” former Senator Steven Benoit commented in response to the decrees. “He does not realize that we are no longer in 1957,” he continued, in reference to Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier who created his own intelligence agency in the early years of the dictatorship. Even before these recent decrees, 11 human rights organizations had condemned the “dictatorial and unconstitutional” actions of the current administration.
On December 12, the Core Group in Haiti issued a press release “expressing concern” over the new decrees. The Decree on the Strengthening of Public Security, the diplomatic representatives note, “extends the qualification of ‘terrorist act’ to certain facts that do not fall under it and provides for particularly heavy penalties.” The intelligence agency, the Core Group, continued, gives “the agents of this institution virtual legal immunity, thus opening up the possibility of abuse.” Taken together, these decrees “do not seem to conform to certain fundamental principles of democracy, the rule of law and the civil and political rights of citizens.”
So, what is in these new decrees?
A New Intelligence Agency
The National Intelligence Agency (ANI by its French acronym) is a technical and administrative institution, whose primary focus is on information gathering and the repression of hostile acts that could be perceived as a threat to national security. Though the new agency will operate under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, the president has the sole authority to name a director general and other high-level positions (Art. 54).
The ANI will be staffed by individuals recruited from the National Police Academy and from the military. The decree includes scant information on the vetting of ANI officers, but notes that recruits will be subject to testing as well as to psychological and moral inquiries (Art. 32). The officers, whose identities will remain anonymous due to national security concerns, will also be armed (Art. 51) . The decree also grants total secrecy to the ANI’s operations. The ANI is authorized to conduct surveillance and will have access to all relevant government databases. Officers will also be able to enter private homes or businesses at any time in order to access documents, objects, or anything else relevant to an ongoing investigation (Art. 55).
ANI officers will not be regular civil servants, but instead will hold a special status, de facto creating a third armed force in the country (Art. 33). The decree also grants legal protection to all ANI officers (Art. 49). There is no possibility for legal recourse in the case of abuse without prior authorization from the president. The agency itself is protected from any legal action that seeks to prevent its functioning or the execution of its activities (Art. 67). The decree offers relatively little information as to how this new agency might be funded.
An Expanded Definition of Terrorism
The Decree for the Reinforcement of Public Security expands the definition of “terrorism” to include such acts as robbery, extortion, arson, and the destruction or degradation of public and private goods.
Articles 1.12 and 1.13, however, go even further and specify that acts of crowding or blocking public roads to obstruct movement are included in this expanded definition. The decree specifies that even so much as placing garbage in a public road would fall under the new definition of terrorism. Blocking roads is a common protest tactic in Haiti, as in many other countries.
The decree also specifics penalties under the new definition. Those found guilty of committing “terrorist acts” can spend from 30 to 50 years in prison and face a fine ranging from two million to two-hundred million Haitian gourdes (about $28,000 – $2,800,000 at today’s exchange rate). The decree states that the penalties cannot be lowered under any circumstance. Individuals can be exempted from punishment if they provide the authorities with information that prevents a terrorist act and leads to the arrest of the individuals or groups responsible.
Oddly, the decree states that, if there are any reservations, the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate has 30 days to introduce a new law in parliament. The parliament has not functioned since January 2020.
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
The follow is a guest post from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti.
On Thursday, December 10, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) will hold a hearing on pervasive impunity and a lack of judicial independence in Haiti. The event will be broadcast live here. The Commission, a quasi‐judicial body of the Organization of American States (OAS) mandated to protect human rights, called this hearing in response to a Request submitted by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI). We will be posting additional information and documents on the IJDH website.
The civil society delegation at the hearing will be comprised of Mario Joseph, Managing Director of the BAI; Alexandra Filippova, an attorney with IJDH; Sonel Jean-Francois, Director of Judicial Inspection for the Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire (and former Director of Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers – Haiti’s Central Financial Intelligence Unit); and Lionel Constant Bourgoin, former prosecutor and former Director General for Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption, Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit. The government of Haiti is also invited to attend; it has sent representatives in the past, as with last year’s IACHR thematic hearing on corruption.
At the hearing, we plan to demonstrate the pervasive nature of impunity in Haiti with examples of continued lack of accountability for individuals (i) convicted in absentia in the 1994 Raboteau massacre trial; (ii) implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre, 2019 Bel-Air massacre, and similar ongoing violence; and (iii) responsible for Duvalier-era human rights violations. We will likewise highlight how such pervasive impunity, alongside judicial dysfunction and corruption, leave perpetrators free and emboldened to commit further abuses, abandon victims without recourse, and undermine public confidence in the justice system; in our view, they can be directly linked to rising violence and insecurity in Haiti. It is our legal assessment that such impunity and lack of judicial independence represent serious violations of Haiti’s obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and thus merit the IACHR’s active engagement to support the people of Haiti in their efforts to secure accountability for abuses and a judicial system that protects and advances justice. We hope that this hearing is one more step towards that goal.
This post will be updated after the hearing with links to the participants’ written submissions before the IACHR.
[Update 12/14/2020]:
You can watch the full recording of the hearing here.
BAI & IJDH Request for Thematic Hearing of September 23, 2020 (French version)
BAI & IJDH Written Submission of November 16, 2020 (French version); Attachment 1 (IJDH Human Rights Update of March-October 2020)
The follow is a guest post from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti.
On Thursday, December 10, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) will hold a hearing on pervasive impunity and a lack of judicial independence in Haiti. The event will be broadcast live here. The Commission, a quasi‐judicial body of the Organization of American States (OAS) mandated to protect human rights, called this hearing in response to a Request submitted by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI). We will be posting additional information and documents on the IJDH website.
The civil society delegation at the hearing will be comprised of Mario Joseph, Managing Director of the BAI; Alexandra Filippova, an attorney with IJDH; Sonel Jean-Francois, Director of Judicial Inspection for the Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire (and former Director of Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers – Haiti’s Central Financial Intelligence Unit); and Lionel Constant Bourgoin, former prosecutor and former Director General for Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption, Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit. The government of Haiti is also invited to attend; it has sent representatives in the past, as with last year’s IACHR thematic hearing on corruption.
At the hearing, we plan to demonstrate the pervasive nature of impunity in Haiti with examples of continued lack of accountability for individuals (i) convicted in absentia in the 1994 Raboteau massacre trial; (ii) implicated in the 2018 La Saline massacre, 2019 Bel-Air massacre, and similar ongoing violence; and (iii) responsible for Duvalier-era human rights violations. We will likewise highlight how such pervasive impunity, alongside judicial dysfunction and corruption, leave perpetrators free and emboldened to commit further abuses, abandon victims without recourse, and undermine public confidence in the justice system; in our view, they can be directly linked to rising violence and insecurity in Haiti. It is our legal assessment that such impunity and lack of judicial independence represent serious violations of Haiti’s obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and thus merit the IACHR’s active engagement to support the people of Haiti in their efforts to secure accountability for abuses and a judicial system that protects and advances justice. We hope that this hearing is one more step towards that goal.
This post will be updated after the hearing with links to the participants’ written submissions before the IACHR.
[Update 12/14/2020]:
You can watch the full recording of the hearing here.
BAI & IJDH Request for Thematic Hearing of September 23, 2020 (French version)
BAI & IJDH Written Submission of November 16, 2020 (French version); Attachment 1 (IJDH Human Rights Update of March-October 2020)
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
On November 18, the 217th anniversary of the Battle of Vertières where Haitians delivered a fatal blow to Napoleon’s troops during their struggle for independence, thousands took to the streets across the country to protest rising insecurity and government inaction. Anti-government actions took place in Cap-Haitien, Gonaïves, l’Estère, Saint-Marc, Delmas, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince,Cayes, Jérémie, Mirebalais, and Jacmel among other locations, according to Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), a rights organization. “The problem of insecurity therefore affects the entire national territory,” FJKL noted. “The demands of the Haitian people against power are gaining ground.”
The national day of action came just days after president Jovenel Moise appointed a new chief of the Haitian National Police (PNH), Leon Charles. Most recently Haiti’s ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Charles previously served as police chief under the interim government that replaced Jean-Bertrand Aristide following his 2004 ouster.
With the president ruling by decree and consolidating power, Charles’ appointment has raised new concerns about human rights and political violence in Haiti. If last week’s protests provided an early test, the new chief appears to have failed.
The police response to the November 18 protests “demonstrated a blatant lack of professionalism,” FJKL wrote. Street demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas, and, in some cases, with live ammunition. On the Champ de Mars, a young man was shot in the head. Eight others were admitted to area hospitals with bullet wounds. Nearby, a police vehicle rammed into a group of individuals sending at least two to the hospital with serious injuries — one eventually died due to the injuries sustained.
Video of the police vehicle hitting the protestors has been widely shared on social media and sparked outrage from civil society and human right groups. Lyonel Trouillot, a prominent Haitian author, published an op-ed criticizing the authoritarian use of the National Police by successive governments. He also noted the lack of interest from civil society groups in the international community. “It is shameful that a national call is not sent to international civil societies in the face of such acts […] for them to hold their representatives who might want to lend their support to a murderous regime, accountable,” he wrote.
The result of the day was conclusive, according to FJKL, the rights organization. “The PNH no longer considers the right to demonstrate as a democratic right.” Rather, FJKL continued, the police have become politicized and “[do] not act as a professional body responsible for ensuring the exercise of democratic rights.”
FJKL called on Charles, the new police chief, to immediately conduct an investigation into who is responsible for the abuses and to hold those actors accountable. “What the Haitian people expect from the new Director General of the PNH is the mobilization of the police to fight against gangs, kidnappers, insecurity … The police should in no way interfere with the exercise of the democratic rights of the population. Its priority is to protect them.” Taking a differing approach, the following day Charles released a statement commending the professionalism of the police in their response to the day of protests.
In its most recent report on the human rights situation in Haiti, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) documented the alarmingly high level of insecurity that is particularly affecting poor neighborhoods in and around Port-au-Prince. Between March and August, there have been 701 reported killings and 161 kidnappings, according to the UN Secretary-General. The current government’s relative silence in the face of such abuses and its failure to address spiralling violence continues to spark outrage and lead to more public demonstrations. In turn, peaceful protestors have become targets of the oppressive and growingly aggressive nature of the Haitian National Police.
The rise in reported kidnapping and acts of violence is punctuated by an increase in police involvement; IJDH notes that ΅local human rights organizations investigating the rise in violence have documented the involvement of police officers and state officials in numerous attacks against marginalized communities and raised credible concerns that gang violence is being deployed as a tool of political repression.” It went on to state that threats to the judiciary system, corruption, and a lack of accountability also seem to be increasing.
Inheriting a fragmented National Police, Léon Charles will have to deal with “Fantom 509,” a group of police officers who have expressed dissatisfaction with their employers and have demanded better pay and working conditions. Yet they have also been known to cause panic in the country’s capital through at-times violent protests and destruction of government property.
“We’re in a situation where there are a lot of problems inside the police and in a context like this, it’s not easy for a director general of the police to give results,” Gédéon Jean, a lawyer with the Center for Human Rights Analysis told the Miami Herald. “If things do not change, it’s not Léon Charles who is going to come make a difference.”
Indeed, Charles has his own history as police chief to contend with as well. Working with UN troops after the 2004 coup, the Haitian police were involved in a widespread, iron-fisted, and politically-motivated crackdown in Haiti’s capital that left thousands dead. As police chief, Charles also oversaw the reincorporation of former members of the military into the force despite questions over human rights vetting. Further, a human rights report from the University of Miami found that Charles “routinely [gave] orders to stop political demonstrations, and the police [did not] hesitate to perform for him.”
As the Herald notes, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed that foreign officials privately questioned Charles’ ability to adequately confront the insecurity at the time. “Charles was unwilling or unable to discipline or arrest officers that everybody knows are corrupt and colluding with the kidnappers,” one June 2005 cable noted. He was removed from his post one month later.
This time, Charles replaced Normil Rameau — widely seen as backed by the US and other donors, who continue to provide the local force with funding and training. Given that level of support, it is unlikely that Moise would have moved forward with Charles’ appointment without the support of the donor community, especially the US. Since Trump took office, the US has nearly quadrupled its support to Haiti’s police — from $2.8 million in 2016 to more than $12.4 million last year. This fall, the US reallocated an additional $8 million in assistance for fiscal year 2021, likely pushing the figure even higher.
On November 17, the State Department responded to a bicameral Congressional letter led by Representative Wilson (D-FL) and Senator Markey (D-MA) that expressed concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in Haiti. “Our Embassy continues to regularly raise concerns about insecurity and human rights abuses with the Haitian government,” State noted, while adding that continued financial assistance “supports the Haitian National Police’s efforts to maintain order, arrest perpetrators of human rights abuses… and strengthen accountability within the police force.”
On November 18, the 217th anniversary of the Battle of Vertières where Haitians delivered a fatal blow to Napoleon’s troops during their struggle for independence, thousands took to the streets across the country to protest rising insecurity and government inaction. Anti-government actions took place in Cap-Haitien, Gonaïves, l’Estère, Saint-Marc, Delmas, Tabarre, Port-au-Prince,Cayes, Jérémie, Mirebalais, and Jacmel among other locations, according to Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), a rights organization. “The problem of insecurity therefore affects the entire national territory,” FJKL noted. “The demands of the Haitian people against power are gaining ground.”
The national day of action came just days after president Jovenel Moise appointed a new chief of the Haitian National Police (PNH), Leon Charles. Most recently Haiti’s ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Charles previously served as police chief under the interim government that replaced Jean-Bertrand Aristide following his 2004 ouster.
With the president ruling by decree and consolidating power, Charles’ appointment has raised new concerns about human rights and political violence in Haiti. If last week’s protests provided an early test, the new chief appears to have failed.
The police response to the November 18 protests “demonstrated a blatant lack of professionalism,” FJKL wrote. Street demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas, and, in some cases, with live ammunition. On the Champ de Mars, a young man was shot in the head. Eight others were admitted to area hospitals with bullet wounds. Nearby, a police vehicle rammed into a group of individuals sending at least two to the hospital with serious injuries — one eventually died due to the injuries sustained.
Video of the police vehicle hitting the protestors has been widely shared on social media and sparked outrage from civil society and human right groups. Lyonel Trouillot, a prominent Haitian author, published an op-ed criticizing the authoritarian use of the National Police by successive governments. He also noted the lack of interest from civil society groups in the international community. “It is shameful that a national call is not sent to international civil societies in the face of such acts […] for them to hold their representatives who might want to lend their support to a murderous regime, accountable,” he wrote.
The result of the day was conclusive, according to FJKL, the rights organization. “The PNH no longer considers the right to demonstrate as a democratic right.” Rather, FJKL continued, the police have become politicized and “[do] not act as a professional body responsible for ensuring the exercise of democratic rights.”
FJKL called on Charles, the new police chief, to immediately conduct an investigation into who is responsible for the abuses and to hold those actors accountable. “What the Haitian people expect from the new Director General of the PNH is the mobilization of the police to fight against gangs, kidnappers, insecurity … The police should in no way interfere with the exercise of the democratic rights of the population. Its priority is to protect them.” Taking a differing approach, the following day Charles released a statement commending the professionalism of the police in their response to the day of protests.
In its most recent report on the human rights situation in Haiti, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) documented the alarmingly high level of insecurity that is particularly affecting poor neighborhoods in and around Port-au-Prince. Between March and August, there have been 701 reported killings and 161 kidnappings, according to the UN Secretary-General. The current government’s relative silence in the face of such abuses and its failure to address spiralling violence continues to spark outrage and lead to more public demonstrations. In turn, peaceful protestors have become targets of the oppressive and growingly aggressive nature of the Haitian National Police.
The rise in reported kidnapping and acts of violence is punctuated by an increase in police involvement; IJDH notes that ΅local human rights organizations investigating the rise in violence have documented the involvement of police officers and state officials in numerous attacks against marginalized communities and raised credible concerns that gang violence is being deployed as a tool of political repression.” It went on to state that threats to the judiciary system, corruption, and a lack of accountability also seem to be increasing.
Inheriting a fragmented National Police, Léon Charles will have to deal with “Fantom 509,” a group of police officers who have expressed dissatisfaction with their employers and have demanded better pay and working conditions. Yet they have also been known to cause panic in the country’s capital through at-times violent protests and destruction of government property.
“We’re in a situation where there are a lot of problems inside the police and in a context like this, it’s not easy for a director general of the police to give results,” Gédéon Jean, a lawyer with the Center for Human Rights Analysis told the Miami Herald. “If things do not change, it’s not Léon Charles who is going to come make a difference.”
Indeed, Charles has his own history as police chief to contend with as well. Working with UN troops after the 2004 coup, the Haitian police were involved in a widespread, iron-fisted, and politically-motivated crackdown in Haiti’s capital that left thousands dead. As police chief, Charles also oversaw the reincorporation of former members of the military into the force despite questions over human rights vetting. Further, a human rights report from the University of Miami found that Charles “routinely [gave] orders to stop political demonstrations, and the police [did not] hesitate to perform for him.”
As the Herald notes, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks revealed that foreign officials privately questioned Charles’ ability to adequately confront the insecurity at the time. “Charles was unwilling or unable to discipline or arrest officers that everybody knows are corrupt and colluding with the kidnappers,” one June 2005 cable noted. He was removed from his post one month later.
This time, Charles replaced Normil Rameau — widely seen as backed by the US and other donors, who continue to provide the local force with funding and training. Given that level of support, it is unlikely that Moise would have moved forward with Charles’ appointment without the support of the donor community, especially the US. Since Trump took office, the US has nearly quadrupled its support to Haiti’s police — from $2.8 million in 2016 to more than $12.4 million last year. This fall, the US reallocated an additional $8 million in assistance for fiscal year 2021, likely pushing the figure even higher.
On November 17, the State Department responded to a bicameral Congressional letter led by Representative Wilson (D-FL) and Senator Markey (D-MA) that expressed concern over the deteriorating human rights situation in Haiti. “Our Embassy continues to regularly raise concerns about insecurity and human rights abuses with the Haitian government,” State noted, while adding that continued financial assistance “supports the Haitian National Police’s efforts to maintain order, arrest perpetrators of human rights abuses… and strengthen accountability within the police force.”
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
On Friday, November 6, the Haitian government published in Le Moniteur a new decree limiting the powers of the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA). The decree itself was signed by the president and ministers nearly two months earlier, on September 9, but was not formally made public until this past weekend. The court, one of only a handful of nominally independent government institutions, is responsible for reviewing draft government contracts as well as conducting audits. While its functions and title have been altered over time, the court was first established in 1823, and was only completely eliminated during the 19-year US occupation of Haiti. It was reestablished afterward and enshrined in the 1987 constitution.
President Moïse has ruled by decree, which is not formally allowed by the Haitian constitution, since January 2020, when the terms of most of parliament expired. He has extended executive powers, reforming the penal code, naming a new electoral council with a mandate to reform the constitution, and now weakening one of the last remaining institutions exercising government oversight. The latest decree follows years of conflict between the CSCCA and the Haitian presidency.
In 2018, anticorruption protesters began advocating for an investigation into Moïse and his predecessors’ handling of billions in Petrocaribe-related spending. Moïse, under increasing pressure from the streets, pledged to support such an investigation. The CSCCA has since released three audit reports on Petrocaribe, finding widespread irregularities and fraudulent practices in the management of the Venezuelan-led aid program, and directly implicating the president, and the company he led before his election. Last year, members of the court had to temporarily leave the country due to threats. As of yet, there has been no real judicial progress in holding anyone accountable for the misuse of public funds. The president has denied all the CSCCA’s allegations.
The conflict has extended beyond just the Petrocaribe investigation, however. In June, the court raised questions over a contract to provide the presidency with helicopters, which had gone to a close political ally. The same month, the CSCCA was accused of hampering the response to COVID when it identified irregularities in a number of contracts to provide the health ministry with face masks awarded under a state of emergency exception. The contracts, worth about $10 million, moved forward despite the concerns — which included companies that had no experience in the sector and one which was owned by the wife of a current minister in the government. The health emergency “served as a pretext … to accelerate the corruption machine,” according to The Center of Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH). The organization found that $34 million in emergency spending had bypassed CSCCA review all together.
In late August, the court blocked a $57 million no-bid government contract with the US company, General Electric, and asked the government to make needed corrections. The president has held the deal up as a key to his pledge to provide electricity across the country. According to the court, one reason for the court’s delay in approving the GE contract was the presence of unknown subcontractors that were to be paid a portion of the total amount.
On September 6, Moïse held a “community dialogue” at the National Palace, where he declared that it would be necessary to “reform” the CSCCA. Public works minister Joacéus Nader went so far as to say the court was blocking progress in the country, and referred to its independent judges as “ignorant” and “incompetent.”
In response to comments made by Moïse, the court issued a five-page statement outlining a series of acts of intimidation and threats on its members. The court also provided some of the reasons why it had not approved contracts. “How is the Court responsible for the invalidity of this draft contract? Where are the blocking acts? Who is blocking whom, or who is blocking what?” the court asked.
Prime Minister Joseph Jouthe attempted to ease tensions, apologizing just days later on Nader’s behalf, and telling Haitian daily Le Nouvelliste that while it was possible to remove bottlenecks in contract processing, changes would not be made without the court’s involvement. We now know that by the time of Jouthe’s apology, the government had already drafted and signed the decree curtailing the court’s powers — but it had not yet been made public.
Two weeks after Jouthe’s apology, Nader appeared at the CSCCA’s offices in Petionville, claiming he and the large group he arrived with were there simply to check on the status of the General Electric contract. But the president of the court had a different interpretation: “When you come into an institution with a group of heavily armed men who have their faces covered and dressed in black, and whom we can’t even identify if they are police and they cross all of the perimeters to go into an area that is extremely sensitive where even some of the judges don’t go to, that is nothing more than an act of intimidation,” Rogavil Boisguéné told the Miami Herald. “It was a threat to prevent the court from doing its job.”
With the recent changes made by decree, the Haitian presidency will no longer have to wait for the court’s approval before moving forward with government contracts. In the decree, the Moïse administration argues that the reform is necessary due to the “unjustified slowness in the signing of contracts,” which, it argues, “is detrimental to the socio-economic development of the country.” A significant change is that the court’s opinions on draft contracts will only be “advisory” now. The court also will only have three to five days to issue an opinion before the government can move forward with the contract in question. Overall, the court’s review has been changed from ex-ante to ex-post; the court will still provide oversight, but only after the contract has been executed.
On November 12, the CSCCA’s president issued a brief statement taking note of the government’s decree. In the release, Boisguéné states that the court’s ex-ante control is derived from a “strict application” of the constitution and reminds public officials that “the administrative and financial responsibilities attached to their functions are strictly personal” and that is it “their responsibility” to “ensure that … opinions are respected within the framework of this constitutional provision.”
Haiti’s public finance system is notoriously cumbersome. In 2016, the World Bank noted that multiple institutions played similar roles in approving contracts, and that the CSCCA was conflicted in that it both approved contracts and then audited spending afterward. The National Commission on Public Procurement (CNMP) is also tasked with approving government contracts. “There is considerable debate within Haiti and among donors over the appropriateness and the utility of this ex-ante role [for the CSCCA]. However, it continues to date,” the Bank wrote. The new decree specifies that if the CNMP has approved of a contract, the CSCCA cannot prevent its execution regardless of if irregularities are identified.
But, shifting the CSCCA’s role without further efforts to ensure it is able to provide effective oversight on the back end sends a dangerous message, according to activists. The court would still be able to conduct audit reports such as those it produced on Petrocaribe, but the lack of judicial follow up to that report serves as an example of why limiting the court to after-the-fact auditing will be of limited value in preventing government waste or holding officials accountable.
With the president replacing the heads of the anticorruption and anti-money-laundering institutions in 2017, parliament now dissolved and the judiciary seemingly unable or unwilling to take on politically sensitive cases, the CSCCA had been one of the last remaining institutions able to check the powers of the presidency. In a country with a long track record of impunity, the changes have sounded alarm bells.
“Since 1986, we never had a head of state who had shown so much desire to neutralize the institutions of control,” economist Etzer Emile Tweeted. “This new decree could open the door for more acts of corruption in a country where impunity is king,” he added. Emile acknowledged that administrative procedures may be burdensome, but “it does not mean we have to remove the locks.” Checks and balances, he continued, “are critical … to guarantee transparency and good governance.”
On Sunday, a group of opposition political leaders issued a statement decrying the government’s desire to “to transform the country into a lawless state.” Moïse, the leaders argue, has repeatedly ignored constitutional limits on executive power, and they noted that ministers who sign these unconstitutional decrees could face legal repercussions after leaving office.
The president, in an interview Monday morning with Tele Métropole, was defiant. He repeated the argument that the reform was necessary to take on entrenched interests that simply wanted to block progress, and claimed that the decree would actually strengthen the CSCCA by allowing it to just focus on its auditing role. There is little doubt that Haiti’s procurement system needs to be reformed, but, in a comment to HRRW, a former high-ranking government official, who asked to remain anonymous, offered a different rationale for the changes: “To have the road completely opened to allow contracts without any restrictions to his friends or partners.”
On Friday, November 6, the Haitian government published in Le Moniteur a new decree limiting the powers of the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA). The decree itself was signed by the president and ministers nearly two months earlier, on September 9, but was not formally made public until this past weekend. The court, one of only a handful of nominally independent government institutions, is responsible for reviewing draft government contracts as well as conducting audits. While its functions and title have been altered over time, the court was first established in 1823, and was only completely eliminated during the 19-year US occupation of Haiti. It was reestablished afterward and enshrined in the 1987 constitution.
President Moïse has ruled by decree, which is not formally allowed by the Haitian constitution, since January 2020, when the terms of most of parliament expired. He has extended executive powers, reforming the penal code, naming a new electoral council with a mandate to reform the constitution, and now weakening one of the last remaining institutions exercising government oversight. The latest decree follows years of conflict between the CSCCA and the Haitian presidency.
In 2018, anticorruption protesters began advocating for an investigation into Moïse and his predecessors’ handling of billions in Petrocaribe-related spending. Moïse, under increasing pressure from the streets, pledged to support such an investigation. The CSCCA has since released three audit reports on Petrocaribe, finding widespread irregularities and fraudulent practices in the management of the Venezuelan-led aid program, and directly implicating the president, and the company he led before his election. Last year, members of the court had to temporarily leave the country due to threats. As of yet, there has been no real judicial progress in holding anyone accountable for the misuse of public funds. The president has denied all the CSCCA’s allegations.
The conflict has extended beyond just the Petrocaribe investigation, however. In June, the court raised questions over a contract to provide the presidency with helicopters, which had gone to a close political ally. The same month, the CSCCA was accused of hampering the response to COVID when it identified irregularities in a number of contracts to provide the health ministry with face masks awarded under a state of emergency exception. The contracts, worth about $10 million, moved forward despite the concerns — which included companies that had no experience in the sector and one which was owned by the wife of a current minister in the government. The health emergency “served as a pretext … to accelerate the corruption machine,” according to The Center of Analysis and Research in Human Rights (CARDH). The organization found that $34 million in emergency spending had bypassed CSCCA review all together.
In late August, the court blocked a $57 million no-bid government contract with the US company, General Electric, and asked the government to make needed corrections. The president has held the deal up as a key to his pledge to provide electricity across the country. According to the court, one reason for the court’s delay in approving the GE contract was the presence of unknown subcontractors that were to be paid a portion of the total amount.
On September 6, Moïse held a “community dialogue” at the National Palace, where he declared that it would be necessary to “reform” the CSCCA. Public works minister Joacéus Nader went so far as to say the court was blocking progress in the country, and referred to its independent judges as “ignorant” and “incompetent.”
In response to comments made by Moïse, the court issued a five-page statement outlining a series of acts of intimidation and threats on its members. The court also provided some of the reasons why it had not approved contracts. “How is the Court responsible for the invalidity of this draft contract? Where are the blocking acts? Who is blocking whom, or who is blocking what?” the court asked.
Prime Minister Joseph Jouthe attempted to ease tensions, apologizing just days later on Nader’s behalf, and telling Haitian daily Le Nouvelliste that while it was possible to remove bottlenecks in contract processing, changes would not be made without the court’s involvement. We now know that by the time of Jouthe’s apology, the government had already drafted and signed the decree curtailing the court’s powers — but it had not yet been made public.
Two weeks after Jouthe’s apology, Nader appeared at the CSCCA’s offices in Petionville, claiming he and the large group he arrived with were there simply to check on the status of the General Electric contract. But the president of the court had a different interpretation: “When you come into an institution with a group of heavily armed men who have their faces covered and dressed in black, and whom we can’t even identify if they are police and they cross all of the perimeters to go into an area that is extremely sensitive where even some of the judges don’t go to, that is nothing more than an act of intimidation,” Rogavil Boisguéné told the Miami Herald. “It was a threat to prevent the court from doing its job.”
With the recent changes made by decree, the Haitian presidency will no longer have to wait for the court’s approval before moving forward with government contracts. In the decree, the Moïse administration argues that the reform is necessary due to the “unjustified slowness in the signing of contracts,” which, it argues, “is detrimental to the socio-economic development of the country.” A significant change is that the court’s opinions on draft contracts will only be “advisory” now. The court also will only have three to five days to issue an opinion before the government can move forward with the contract in question. Overall, the court’s review has been changed from ex-ante to ex-post; the court will still provide oversight, but only after the contract has been executed.
On November 12, the CSCCA’s president issued a brief statement taking note of the government’s decree. In the release, Boisguéné states that the court’s ex-ante control is derived from a “strict application” of the constitution and reminds public officials that “the administrative and financial responsibilities attached to their functions are strictly personal” and that is it “their responsibility” to “ensure that … opinions are respected within the framework of this constitutional provision.”
Haiti’s public finance system is notoriously cumbersome. In 2016, the World Bank noted that multiple institutions played similar roles in approving contracts, and that the CSCCA was conflicted in that it both approved contracts and then audited spending afterward. The National Commission on Public Procurement (CNMP) is also tasked with approving government contracts. “There is considerable debate within Haiti and among donors over the appropriateness and the utility of this ex-ante role [for the CSCCA]. However, it continues to date,” the Bank wrote. The new decree specifies that if the CNMP has approved of a contract, the CSCCA cannot prevent its execution regardless of if irregularities are identified.
But, shifting the CSCCA’s role without further efforts to ensure it is able to provide effective oversight on the back end sends a dangerous message, according to activists. The court would still be able to conduct audit reports such as those it produced on Petrocaribe, but the lack of judicial follow up to that report serves as an example of why limiting the court to after-the-fact auditing will be of limited value in preventing government waste or holding officials accountable.
With the president replacing the heads of the anticorruption and anti-money-laundering institutions in 2017, parliament now dissolved and the judiciary seemingly unable or unwilling to take on politically sensitive cases, the CSCCA had been one of the last remaining institutions able to check the powers of the presidency. In a country with a long track record of impunity, the changes have sounded alarm bells.
“Since 1986, we never had a head of state who had shown so much desire to neutralize the institutions of control,” economist Etzer Emile Tweeted. “This new decree could open the door for more acts of corruption in a country where impunity is king,” he added. Emile acknowledged that administrative procedures may be burdensome, but “it does not mean we have to remove the locks.” Checks and balances, he continued, “are critical … to guarantee transparency and good governance.”
On Sunday, a group of opposition political leaders issued a statement decrying the government’s desire to “to transform the country into a lawless state.” Moïse, the leaders argue, has repeatedly ignored constitutional limits on executive power, and they noted that ministers who sign these unconstitutional decrees could face legal repercussions after leaving office.
The president, in an interview Monday morning with Tele Métropole, was defiant. He repeated the argument that the reform was necessary to take on entrenched interests that simply wanted to block progress, and claimed that the decree would actually strengthen the CSCCA by allowing it to just focus on its auditing role. There is little doubt that Haiti’s procurement system needs to be reformed, but, in a comment to HRRW, a former high-ranking government official, who asked to remain anonymous, offered a different rationale for the changes: “To have the road completely opened to allow contracts without any restrictions to his friends or partners.”
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUnited StatesEE. UU.US Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.WorldEl Mundo
An Novanm 2019, nan kad sipò li pou PNH, Biwo Entènasyonal Dwòg ak Aplikasyon Lalwa nan Depatman Leta Ameriken bay bay lapolis yon kontra $73,000 pou pwovizyon “kit anti-manifestasyon” pou inite lapolis ki chaje kontwòl foul, CIMO, daprè enfòmasyon ki genyen nan baz done kontra gouvènman Ameriken.
Nan komansman ete a CIMO ak lot inite PNH te itilize gaz lakrimojèn ki fabrike Ozetazini pou yo dispèse aktivis ki te rasanble devan Ministè Lajistis e ki tap manifeste pou dwa a lavi pandan peyi a ap viv yon sitiyasyon prekòs. Lapolis fè zak represyon nan manifestasyon an aloske òganizate yo te resevwa lese pase nan men otorite legal yo avan yo manifeste. Sa se egzamp ki montre poukisa kontra Depatman leta sa yo enkyetan – pa selman poutet jan ekipman sa yo ap sèvi men poutèt òganizasyon ki resevwa kontra sa: X-International.
Daprè rekò entrepriz Florida yo, X-International apateni a Carl Frédéric Martin, alyas “Kappa”. Yon Ayisyen-Ameriken epi se yon ansyen manmb US Navy. Depi kèk lane, Martin enplike nan zafè fòs sekirite an Ayiti byen ke se koze bizness prive li ki pi enkyetan, patikilyèman kontra sa li genyen ak Depatman Leta.
An Jen, près lokal la repote ke Martin avec yon fanmi Dimitri Herard – ki se chèf gad Palè Nasyonal la – fome yon nouvo konpani, Haiti Ordnance Factory S.A (HOFSA). Daprè dokiman anrejistreman li, nouvo konpani sa ta otorize pou li fè zam ak aminisyon an Ayiti. Aprè nouvèl la gaye ke konpani sa te egziste, gouvènman Ayisyen an revoke lisans biznes li. Men sa se te selman youn nan nouvo biznis Dimitri Herard and Carl Frédéric Martin tapral fè.
An Avril 2020, avan koze HOFSA a te rive nan zorèy piblik la, Herard ak Martin te fòme yon lòt konpani: Tradex Haiti S.A. Kontrèman a HOFSA, Tradex pa otorize pou li fabrike zam ak aminisyon, li egziste tankou yon konpayi sekirite ki ka sèlman achte epi van ekipman sa yo. Herard ak Martin tap eseye rantre nan sektè zam lan pou plis pase yon lane. Kounya, daprè yon sous ki gen konesans sou endistri sa an Ayiti, yap opere youn nan dilèchip zam ki pi lucratif nan peyi a.
Arestasyon yon trafikan zam… yon opòtinite rate
Nan fen Desanm 2019, gouvènman Ayisyen an arete yon biznisman, Aby Larco. Akizasyon yo di li te yon sous enpotan nan zafè trafik zam nan peyi Dayiti. Larco te opere yon gwo konpayi zam pandan kek lane, konpayi sa te gen kontra ak Polis Nasyonal, Ambasad Ameriken te sèvi ak konpayi sa anpil pou reparasyon zam tou. Men, komisè ki aretel la di tou, li te enplike anpil nan koze vann zam pa anba, zam ki anpil fwa ta tonbe nan men gwoup kriminèl.
Aprè arestasyon Larco, komisyon dezameman, ki te kreye pou yo retire zam nan men sitwayen, deklare li gen yon lis kriminèl ki te resevwa zam nan men Larco. Plis pase 8 mwa pita, dosye Larco a pa avanse e pa gen nouvo enfòmasyon ki bay sou vant zam ilegal. Pandan tan sa a, arestasyon Larco a fè plas nan mache zam Ayiti pou lòt moun vinn enstale yo.
Daprè plizyè sous ki gen konesans sou dosye sa, Herard ak Martin te an diskisyon ak Larco pandan plizyè mwa pou yo gade si yo ka travay ansanm. A la fen, sous yo di Larco te rejete travay avèk yo. Sèt jou aprè yo finn aretel, anrejistreman HOSFA parèt nan Le Moniteur. Byen ke Prezidan Jovenel Moïse te vantel deske li te arete Larco e li te pale de sa kòm yon gwo viktwa nan koze batay kont trafik zam nan peyi a, gouvènman an pako di anyen sou chèf gad li kap travay tou antan ke yon dilè zam prive.
Herard li menm te enplike nan dosye abi dwa moun. Rapò Depatman Leta sou dwa moun an 2019 note ke Herard:
… tire e blese de(2) sitwayen nan zòn Delmas 15 nan Pòtoprens jou ki te 10 Jen. Aprè ensidan sa, plizye temwen swiv machin Herard lakay li nan Delmas 31. Lè li rive lakay li, Herard ak lòt polisye PNH ki te la kòmanse tire sou gwoup sitwayen yo e yo arive blese de (2) ladan yo.
Byen ke arestasyon Larco kreye plas pou Martin ak Herard rantre nan mache lokal sa, Martin ap travay nan sektè sa pandan byen lontan. Moun ki travay nan endistri sa konen Martin pou travay li konn fè nan asanble zam ak diferan pati- sa vle di manifaktire nouvo zam ki pa gen nimewo de seri, kidonk ke yo paka retrase. Anpil moun kwè ke se Martin ki te bay zam bay mèsenè Ameriken ki te arete an Ayiti an 2010 yo. Gen moun ki te wè li nan lari Potoprens mele ak lapolis pandan manifestasyon anti-gouvènmantal yo nan menm peryòd sa. Gen kèk douzèn manifestan ke yo te touye lè sa, daprè rapò òganizasyon dwa moun.
Etazini ap ogmante finansmanl malgre sitiyasyon dwa yo ap deteryore
An Jen, jou aprè la polis te kraze yon manifestasyon pasifik devan Ministè Lajistis, sitwayen òdinè ki te arme te desann anba lavil. Yo fè pati nouvo alyans: “G9 an Fanmi e Alye” ke ansyen polisye Jimmy Cherizier, dirije. Pesonn pat ka jwen lapolis lè sa a. Washington Post repote sou sa nan debi mwa sa a, li di:
Lè nèg Cherizier yo te pran lari an Jen, temwen di yo te wè yo kap sikile nan machinn Lapolis Nasyonal ak Machinn Fos Sekirite Espesyal. Ministè Lajistis Lucmane Delil denonse gang yo e li pase lòd bay lapolis pou yo swiv yo, apre kèk èdtan, Moïse revokel.
Kèk jou avan atik Washington Post lan, ni Anbasad Ameriken ak misyon Nasyon Zini an Ayiti a denonse proliferasyon ak pouvwa gwoup ame yo an Ayiti. Nasyon Zini espesyalman pale de Cherizier, sitou de enplikasyonl nan masak Gran Ravine an 2017, La Saline an 2019 ak tout lòt abi li fè depi lè a.
Òganizasyon dwa moun nan peyi a denonse fòmasyon G9 la e yo di ke alyans sa fè pati de plan gouvènman pou li konsolide kontwòl sou zòn nan peyi a ki plen moun avan eleksyon ki swadizan ap planifyen yo. Cherizier denye ke lap travay ak administrasyon Moïse la. Washington Post kontinye ekri:
Men pou konpatriyòt li ki soufri anpil, gwoup Cherizier a, G9, envoke anpil nan laterè Tonton Makout yo, ki te gwoup paramilitè ki terorize Ayiti pandan deseni anba diktaktè François “Papa Doc” Duvalier avek pitit li, Jean-Claude.
Pierre Esperance, Direktè RNDDH di “Gouvènman an pa di anyen a pwopo de [ekstansyon Cherizier a], e kominote entènasyonal la fè komsi yo pa wè.” “Pa gen eta de lwa anko, gang yo tounen makout. Sanble gen yon volonte pou yo enstale yon nouvo diktati.”
Reprezantant Amerikèn ki soti California, Maxine Waters, kondane Cherizier ak mank inisyativ gouvènman an, li pwente dwèt sou administrasyon Trump lan ak sipò li kontinye bay gouvènman Ayisyen an. Li di Washington Post “Pa gen vre preyokipasyon sou Ayisyen yo ak ka yo- ke prezidan an ap touyen yo oubyen bat yo […] toutotan nou gen prezidan an sou bò nou, tout bagay ok”
Michele Sison ki se yon ansyen Anbasadè Etazini an Ayiti di Post la konsa “olye pou nap lonje dwe sou moun […] bi nou se pou nou ankouraje tout aktè pou yo panse a sak pi sansib yo e kontinye fè fas a pi gwo difikilte yo”
Nan yo dènye rapò, RNDDH rapòte ke te gen omwen 111 moun ki te mouri anba zak vyolans gang nan Cité Soleil nan mwa Jen an Jiyè. Arestasyon Larco a an Desanm 2019 lan sanble pa afekte trafik zam na peyi a. Nan dènye semèn sa yo, temwen di yo wè moun kap pote gwo zam otomatik ki sanble travay Martin konn fè a. Sa a vle di ke gen yon posibilite ke zam li yo rive nan men gang ak gwoup vyolan, ke li vlel ou pa. Men menm lè akizasyon vyolasyon dwa moun -ak konplisite Lapolis- kontinye monte, Etazini kontinye ogmante sipò pal pou PNH.
Nan debi mwa sa, Depatman Leta di Kongrè a ke lap rebay $8 million nan bidjè ane denyè pou sipo PNH. Depi lè Trump prezidan, Etazini miltipliye sipò li pou PNH an 4. Li te kòmanse a $2.8 milyon an 2016 e ane dènyè li te rive $12.4 milyon. Avèk dènye realokasyon sa, chif ane sa a gen pou li pi wo. Sipò finansye ameriken yo bay PNH la reprezante plis pase 10% bidjè enstitisyon sa.
PNH, ki sot selebre 25 an degzistans, pa byen finanse e anpil nan anplwaye li yo pa menm resevwa yon salè regilye. Men nan anviwonman sa a, sipò Etazini ap bay la, pa sanble lap regle anyen espesyalman pa rapò a sitiyasyon sekirite a kap deteryore. Pou lapèn, sipò diplomatik ak finansye nan men administrasyon Trump la sanble ap soude rezo koripsyon yo ki ap antretni sitiyasyon ensekirite sa, sa ka gen konsekans motèl pou anpil moun.
Lajan Depatman Leta bay X-International selman reprezante yo ti mòso nan sipò finansye li bay PNH men malgre sa li represzante youn nan manyè sipò Ameriken an kontinye kenbe sitiyasyon peyi a janl ye a.
An Novanm 2019, nan kad sipò li pou PNH, Biwo Entènasyonal Dwòg ak Aplikasyon Lalwa nan Depatman Leta Ameriken bay bay lapolis yon kontra $73,000 pou pwovizyon “kit anti-manifestasyon” pou inite lapolis ki chaje kontwòl foul, CIMO, daprè enfòmasyon ki genyen nan baz done kontra gouvènman Ameriken.
Nan komansman ete a CIMO ak lot inite PNH te itilize gaz lakrimojèn ki fabrike Ozetazini pou yo dispèse aktivis ki te rasanble devan Ministè Lajistis e ki tap manifeste pou dwa a lavi pandan peyi a ap viv yon sitiyasyon prekòs. Lapolis fè zak represyon nan manifestasyon an aloske òganizate yo te resevwa lese pase nan men otorite legal yo avan yo manifeste. Sa se egzamp ki montre poukisa kontra Depatman leta sa yo enkyetan – pa selman poutet jan ekipman sa yo ap sèvi men poutèt òganizasyon ki resevwa kontra sa: X-International.
Daprè rekò entrepriz Florida yo, X-International apateni a Carl Frédéric Martin, alyas “Kappa”. Yon Ayisyen-Ameriken epi se yon ansyen manmb US Navy. Depi kèk lane, Martin enplike nan zafè fòs sekirite an Ayiti byen ke se koze bizness prive li ki pi enkyetan, patikilyèman kontra sa li genyen ak Depatman Leta.
An Jen, près lokal la repote ke Martin avec yon fanmi Dimitri Herard – ki se chèf gad Palè Nasyonal la – fome yon nouvo konpani, Haiti Ordnance Factory S.A (HOFSA). Daprè dokiman anrejistreman li, nouvo konpani sa ta otorize pou li fè zam ak aminisyon an Ayiti. Aprè nouvèl la gaye ke konpani sa te egziste, gouvènman Ayisyen an revoke lisans biznes li. Men sa se te selman youn nan nouvo biznis Dimitri Herard and Carl Frédéric Martin tapral fè.
An Avril 2020, avan koze HOFSA a te rive nan zorèy piblik la, Herard ak Martin te fòme yon lòt konpani: Tradex Haiti S.A. Kontrèman a HOFSA, Tradex pa otorize pou li fabrike zam ak aminisyon, li egziste tankou yon konpayi sekirite ki ka sèlman achte epi van ekipman sa yo. Herard ak Martin tap eseye rantre nan sektè zam lan pou plis pase yon lane. Kounya, daprè yon sous ki gen konesans sou endistri sa an Ayiti, yap opere youn nan dilèchip zam ki pi lucratif nan peyi a.
Arestasyon yon trafikan zam… yon opòtinite rate
Nan fen Desanm 2019, gouvènman Ayisyen an arete yon biznisman, Aby Larco. Akizasyon yo di li te yon sous enpotan nan zafè trafik zam nan peyi Dayiti. Larco te opere yon gwo konpayi zam pandan kek lane, konpayi sa te gen kontra ak Polis Nasyonal, Ambasad Ameriken te sèvi ak konpayi sa anpil pou reparasyon zam tou. Men, komisè ki aretel la di tou, li te enplike anpil nan koze vann zam pa anba, zam ki anpil fwa ta tonbe nan men gwoup kriminèl.
Aprè arestasyon Larco, komisyon dezameman, ki te kreye pou yo retire zam nan men sitwayen, deklare li gen yon lis kriminèl ki te resevwa zam nan men Larco. Plis pase 8 mwa pita, dosye Larco a pa avanse e pa gen nouvo enfòmasyon ki bay sou vant zam ilegal. Pandan tan sa a, arestasyon Larco a fè plas nan mache zam Ayiti pou lòt moun vinn enstale yo.
Daprè plizyè sous ki gen konesans sou dosye sa, Herard ak Martin te an diskisyon ak Larco pandan plizyè mwa pou yo gade si yo ka travay ansanm. A la fen, sous yo di Larco te rejete travay avèk yo. Sèt jou aprè yo finn aretel, anrejistreman HOSFA parèt nan Le Moniteur. Byen ke Prezidan Jovenel Moïse te vantel deske li te arete Larco e li te pale de sa kòm yon gwo viktwa nan koze batay kont trafik zam nan peyi a, gouvènman an pako di anyen sou chèf gad li kap travay tou antan ke yon dilè zam prive.
Herard li menm te enplike nan dosye abi dwa moun. Rapò Depatman Leta sou dwa moun an 2019 note ke Herard:
… tire e blese de(2) sitwayen nan zòn Delmas 15 nan Pòtoprens jou ki te 10 Jen. Aprè ensidan sa, plizye temwen swiv machin Herard lakay li nan Delmas 31. Lè li rive lakay li, Herard ak lòt polisye PNH ki te la kòmanse tire sou gwoup sitwayen yo e yo arive blese de (2) ladan yo.
Byen ke arestasyon Larco kreye plas pou Martin ak Herard rantre nan mache lokal sa, Martin ap travay nan sektè sa pandan byen lontan. Moun ki travay nan endistri sa konen Martin pou travay li konn fè nan asanble zam ak diferan pati- sa vle di manifaktire nouvo zam ki pa gen nimewo de seri, kidonk ke yo paka retrase. Anpil moun kwè ke se Martin ki te bay zam bay mèsenè Ameriken ki te arete an Ayiti an 2010 yo. Gen moun ki te wè li nan lari Potoprens mele ak lapolis pandan manifestasyon anti-gouvènmantal yo nan menm peryòd sa. Gen kèk douzèn manifestan ke yo te touye lè sa, daprè rapò òganizasyon dwa moun.
Etazini ap ogmante finansmanl malgre sitiyasyon dwa yo ap deteryore
An Jen, jou aprè la polis te kraze yon manifestasyon pasifik devan Ministè Lajistis, sitwayen òdinè ki te arme te desann anba lavil. Yo fè pati nouvo alyans: “G9 an Fanmi e Alye” ke ansyen polisye Jimmy Cherizier, dirije. Pesonn pat ka jwen lapolis lè sa a. Washington Post repote sou sa nan debi mwa sa a, li di:
Lè nèg Cherizier yo te pran lari an Jen, temwen di yo te wè yo kap sikile nan machinn Lapolis Nasyonal ak Machinn Fos Sekirite Espesyal. Ministè Lajistis Lucmane Delil denonse gang yo e li pase lòd bay lapolis pou yo swiv yo, apre kèk èdtan, Moïse revokel.
Kèk jou avan atik Washington Post lan, ni Anbasad Ameriken ak misyon Nasyon Zini an Ayiti a denonse proliferasyon ak pouvwa gwoup ame yo an Ayiti. Nasyon Zini espesyalman pale de Cherizier, sitou de enplikasyonl nan masak Gran Ravine an 2017, La Saline an 2019 ak tout lòt abi li fè depi lè a.
Òganizasyon dwa moun nan peyi a denonse fòmasyon G9 la e yo di ke alyans sa fè pati de plan gouvènman pou li konsolide kontwòl sou zòn nan peyi a ki plen moun avan eleksyon ki swadizan ap planifyen yo. Cherizier denye ke lap travay ak administrasyon Moïse la. Washington Post kontinye ekri:
Men pou konpatriyòt li ki soufri anpil, gwoup Cherizier a, G9, envoke anpil nan laterè Tonton Makout yo, ki te gwoup paramilitè ki terorize Ayiti pandan deseni anba diktaktè François “Papa Doc” Duvalier avek pitit li, Jean-Claude.
Pierre Esperance, Direktè RNDDH di “Gouvènman an pa di anyen a pwopo de [ekstansyon Cherizier a], e kominote entènasyonal la fè komsi yo pa wè.” “Pa gen eta de lwa anko, gang yo tounen makout. Sanble gen yon volonte pou yo enstale yon nouvo diktati.”
Reprezantant Amerikèn ki soti California, Maxine Waters, kondane Cherizier ak mank inisyativ gouvènman an, li pwente dwèt sou administrasyon Trump lan ak sipò li kontinye bay gouvènman Ayisyen an. Li di Washington Post “Pa gen vre preyokipasyon sou Ayisyen yo ak ka yo- ke prezidan an ap touyen yo oubyen bat yo […] toutotan nou gen prezidan an sou bò nou, tout bagay ok”
Michele Sison ki se yon ansyen Anbasadè Etazini an Ayiti di Post la konsa “olye pou nap lonje dwe sou moun […] bi nou se pou nou ankouraje tout aktè pou yo panse a sak pi sansib yo e kontinye fè fas a pi gwo difikilte yo”
Nan yo dènye rapò, RNDDH rapòte ke te gen omwen 111 moun ki te mouri anba zak vyolans gang nan Cité Soleil nan mwa Jen an Jiyè. Arestasyon Larco a an Desanm 2019 lan sanble pa afekte trafik zam na peyi a. Nan dènye semèn sa yo, temwen di yo wè moun kap pote gwo zam otomatik ki sanble travay Martin konn fè a. Sa a vle di ke gen yon posibilite ke zam li yo rive nan men gang ak gwoup vyolan, ke li vlel ou pa. Men menm lè akizasyon vyolasyon dwa moun -ak konplisite Lapolis- kontinye monte, Etazini kontinye ogmante sipò pal pou PNH.
Nan debi mwa sa, Depatman Leta di Kongrè a ke lap rebay $8 million nan bidjè ane denyè pou sipo PNH. Depi lè Trump prezidan, Etazini miltipliye sipò li pou PNH an 4. Li te kòmanse a $2.8 milyon an 2016 e ane dènyè li te rive $12.4 milyon. Avèk dènye realokasyon sa, chif ane sa a gen pou li pi wo. Sipò finansye ameriken yo bay PNH la reprezante plis pase 10% bidjè enstitisyon sa.
PNH, ki sot selebre 25 an degzistans, pa byen finanse e anpil nan anplwaye li yo pa menm resevwa yon salè regilye. Men nan anviwonman sa a, sipò Etazini ap bay la, pa sanble lap regle anyen espesyalman pa rapò a sitiyasyon sekirite a kap deteryore. Pou lapèn, sipò diplomatik ak finansye nan men administrasyon Trump la sanble ap soude rezo koripsyon yo ki ap antretni sitiyasyon ensekirite sa, sa ka gen konsekans motèl pou anpil moun.
Lajan Depatman Leta bay X-International selman reprezante yo ti mòso nan sipò finansye li bay PNH men malgre sa li represzante youn nan manyè sipò Ameriken an kontinye kenbe sitiyasyon peyi a janl ye a.
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
In November, 2019, as part of its support for the Haitian National Police (HNP), the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) awarded a $73,000 contract for the provision of “riot gear kit[s]” for the police’s crowd control unit, CIMO, according to information contained in the US government’s contracting database.
Earlier this summer, CIMO and other HNP units used US-manufactured tear gas to disperse activists who had assembled in front of the Ministry of Justice rallying for the right to life amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation. The police repressed the protest even though the organizers had received proper legal clearance. It was an example of why such State Department contracts are concerning — not just because of how the riot gear can be used on the ground, but because of the firm that received the contract: X-International.
X-International, according to Florida corporate records, is owned by Carl Frédéric Martin, also known as “Kappa.” A Haitian-American and former member of the US Navy, Martin has become increasingly involved in Haiti’s security forces over the last few years, though, his private ventures should raise even more troubling questions about the State Department contract.
In June, local press reported that Martin, together with a relative of Dimitri Herard — the head of Haiti’s palace guard — had formed a new company, Haiti Ordnance Factory S.A. (HOFSA). According to its corporate registration documents, the new company would be authorized to manufacture weapons and ammunition in Haiti. After news of the company’s existence broke, however, the government revoked its business license. But this was just one of Herard and Martin’s new ventures.
In April 2020, before the controversy over HOFSA erupted in public, the two formed another company: Tradex Haiti S.A. Unlike HOFSA, Tradex is not authorized to manufacture weapons or ammunition, but is simply a security company that can buy and sell equipment. Herard and Martin had been trying to break into the arms market for more than a year. Now, according to a source with knowledge of the industry in Haiti, the two are operating one of the most lucrative arms dealerships in the country.
The arrest of an arms dealer … and an opportunity
In late December 2019, the Haitian government arrested businessman Aby Larco, accusing him of being a significant source of arms trafficking in Haiti. Larco had operated a well-known weapons company for years, with contracts with the HNP and also frequently used by the US embassy to repair firearms. But, prosecutors alleged, he was also an important supplier of black market weapons that wound up in the hands of criminal groups.
After Larco’s arrest, the government’s disarmament commission, created to help get weapons out of the hands of civilians, proclaimed it had a list of criminals who had received weapons from Larco. But more than eight months later, the case against Larco has stalled, and no information has been provided about possibly illegal weapon sales. Meanwhile, Larco’s arrest made space in the Haitian arms market for others to move in.
According to multiple sources close to the case, Herard and Martin had been in discussion with Larco for many months with an eye to possibly working together. In the end, however, the sources say Larco rejected their overtures. Seven days after his arrest, HOFSA’s corporate registration was published in Le Moniteur. Though President Jovenel Moïse touted Larco’s arrest as a blow against the proliferation of illegal weapons, the government has remained quiet about the head of the palace guard moonlighting as a private arms dealer.
Herard himself has been implicated in human rights abuses. The State Department’s own 2019 human rights report notes that Herard:
… shot and wounded two civilians in the Delmas 15 area of Port-au-Prince on June 10. Following this incident, several witnesses pursued Herard’s vehicle toward his residence in Delmas 31. Upon arriving at the residence, Herard and other HNP officers on the scene opened fire on the group of civilians, resulting in two others being wounded.
Though Larco’s arrest may have created space for Martin and Herard to enter the local market, Martin has been an arms dealer for much longer. Among those with knowledge of the local arms market, Martin is known for assembling weapons from disparate parts — in other words, manufacturing weapons that lack serial numbers and cannot be tracked. Some believe it was Martin who provided weapons to US mercenaries arrested in Haiti in 2019. Martin was seen on the streets of the capital embedded with the police during the height of anti-government protests around the same time period. Dozens of protesters were killed, according to local human rights organizations.
US increasing police funding despite worsening rights situation
In June, the day after police broke up the peaceful demonstration in front of the ministry of justice, armed civilians rallied in downtown Port-au-Prince. They were part of a new alliance: the “G9 Family and Allies,” led by a former police officer, Jimmy Cherizier. The police were nowhere to be found, however. The Washington Post reported earlier this month:
When Cherizier’s men took to the streets in June, witnesses claimed to have seen them ride in the same armored vehicles used by the national police and special security forces. Justice Minister Lucmane Delile denounced the gangs and ordered the national police to pursue them; within hours, Moïse fired him.
In the days before the Post article, both the US Embassy and the United Nations mission in Haiti denounced the proliferation and power of armed groups in Haiti. The UN specifically mentioned Cherizier, noting his alleged role in the massacres at Grand Ravine in 2017 and La Saline in 2018, and myriad other abuses since.
Local rights organizations have also denounced the formation of the G9, and have alleged that the alliance is part of a government plan to consolidate control in the densely populated capital ahead of yet-to-be-scheduled elections. Cherizier has denied he is working with the Moïse administration. The Post continued:
But for his long-suffering countrymen, Cherizier’s G9 is evoking the horrors of the Tontons Macoutes, the government-backed paramilitaries that terrorized Haiti for decades under dictator François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude.
“The government has said nothing about [Cherizier’s rise], and the international community has turned a blind eye,” said Pierre Espérance, director of Haiti’s National Human Rights Defense Network. “There is no rule of law anymore. The gangs are the new Macoutes. It feels like there is a manifest will to install a new dictatorship.”
US Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) has condemned Cherizier and the government’s inaction, pointing the finger at the Trump administration’s unconditional support for the Haitian government. “There is no real concern for the plight of the Haitians, whether they are being beaten and killed by the president of Haiti,” she told The Post. “As long as the president is in our pockets, everything is okay.”
Michele Sison, the US ambassador to Haiti, pushed back. “Rather than pointing fingers,” she told The Post, “our point is to encourage all actors . . . to think about the most vulnerable who continue to bear the brunt of these challenges.”
In a recent report, the National Human Rights Defense Network reported that at least 111 civilians had been killed in gang violence in Cité Soleil in June and July. The December 2019 arrest of Larco, meanwhile, has done little to stem the illegal flow of weapons. In recent weeks, witnesses have seen armed civilians in Cité Soleil carrying automatic weapons that appear to bear the trademark of Carl Martin’s handiwork, raising the possibility that, willingly or not, his guns may be making their way into the hands of civilians. But even as allegations of rights abuses — and police complicity — pile up, the US has deepened its support for the HNP.
Earlier this month, the State Department notified Congress that it was reallocating $8 million from last year’s budget to support the HNP. Since Trump took office, the US has nearly quadrupled its support to Haiti’s police — from $2.8 million in 2016 to more than $12.4 million last year. With the recent reallocation, the figure this year will likely be even higher. US funding for the Haitian police constitutes more than 10 percent of the institution’s overall budget.
The HNP, which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary, has been chronically underfunded, and many officers do not even receive regular paychecks. But, in the current environment, ramped up US support for the police is unlikely to improve the rapidly devolving security situation. Rather, continued diplomatic and financial support from the Trump administration is likely to only harden the corrupt networks that perpetuate insecurity — with potentially deadly political consequences. The State Department award to X-International makes up only a small portion of overall US support to the police, but nevertheless, it is emblematic of the various ways US assistance empowers Haiti’s status quo.
In November, 2019, as part of its support for the Haitian National Police (HNP), the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) awarded a $73,000 contract for the provision of “riot gear kit[s]” for the police’s crowd control unit, CIMO, according to information contained in the US government’s contracting database.
Earlier this summer, CIMO and other HNP units used US-manufactured tear gas to disperse activists who had assembled in front of the Ministry of Justice rallying for the right to life amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation. The police repressed the protest even though the organizers had received proper legal clearance. It was an example of why such State Department contracts are concerning — not just because of how the riot gear can be used on the ground, but because of the firm that received the contract: X-International.
X-International, according to Florida corporate records, is owned by Carl Frédéric Martin, also known as “Kappa.” A Haitian-American and former member of the US Navy, Martin has become increasingly involved in Haiti’s security forces over the last few years, though, his private ventures should raise even more troubling questions about the State Department contract.
In June, local press reported that Martin, together with a relative of Dimitri Herard — the head of Haiti’s palace guard — had formed a new company, Haiti Ordnance Factory S.A. (HOFSA). According to its corporate registration documents, the new company would be authorized to manufacture weapons and ammunition in Haiti. After news of the company’s existence broke, however, the government revoked its business license. But this was just one of Herard and Martin’s new ventures.
In April 2020, before the controversy over HOFSA erupted in public, the two formed another company: Tradex Haiti S.A. Unlike HOFSA, Tradex is not authorized to manufacture weapons or ammunition, but is simply a security company that can buy and sell equipment. Herard and Martin had been trying to break into the arms market for more than a year. Now, according to a source with knowledge of the industry in Haiti, the two are operating one of the most lucrative arms dealerships in the country.
The arrest of an arms dealer … and an opportunity
In late December 2019, the Haitian government arrested businessman Aby Larco, accusing him of being a significant source of arms trafficking in Haiti. Larco had operated a well-known weapons company for years, with contracts with the HNP and also frequently used by the US embassy to repair firearms. But, prosecutors alleged, he was also an important supplier of black market weapons that wound up in the hands of criminal groups.
After Larco’s arrest, the government’s disarmament commission, created to help get weapons out of the hands of civilians, proclaimed it had a list of criminals who had received weapons from Larco. But more than eight months later, the case against Larco has stalled, and no information has been provided about possibly illegal weapon sales. Meanwhile, Larco’s arrest made space in the Haitian arms market for others to move in.
According to multiple sources close to the case, Herard and Martin had been in discussion with Larco for many months with an eye to possibly working together. In the end, however, the sources say Larco rejected their overtures. Seven days after his arrest, HOFSA’s corporate registration was published in Le Moniteur. Though President Jovenel Moïse touted Larco’s arrest as a blow against the proliferation of illegal weapons, the government has remained quiet about the head of the palace guard moonlighting as a private arms dealer.
Herard himself has been implicated in human rights abuses. The State Department’s own 2019 human rights report notes that Herard:
… shot and wounded two civilians in the Delmas 15 area of Port-au-Prince on June 10. Following this incident, several witnesses pursued Herard’s vehicle toward his residence in Delmas 31. Upon arriving at the residence, Herard and other HNP officers on the scene opened fire on the group of civilians, resulting in two others being wounded.
Though Larco’s arrest may have created space for Martin and Herard to enter the local market, Martin has been an arms dealer for much longer. Among those with knowledge of the local arms market, Martin is known for assembling weapons from disparate parts — in other words, manufacturing weapons that lack serial numbers and cannot be tracked. Some believe it was Martin who provided weapons to US mercenaries arrested in Haiti in 2019. Martin was seen on the streets of the capital embedded with the police during the height of anti-government protests around the same time period. Dozens of protesters were killed, according to local human rights organizations.
US increasing police funding despite worsening rights situation
In June, the day after police broke up the peaceful demonstration in front of the ministry of justice, armed civilians rallied in downtown Port-au-Prince. They were part of a new alliance: the “G9 Family and Allies,” led by a former police officer, Jimmy Cherizier. The police were nowhere to be found, however. The Washington Post reported earlier this month:
When Cherizier’s men took to the streets in June, witnesses claimed to have seen them ride in the same armored vehicles used by the national police and special security forces. Justice Minister Lucmane Delile denounced the gangs and ordered the national police to pursue them; within hours, Moïse fired him.
In the days before the Post article, both the US Embassy and the United Nations mission in Haiti denounced the proliferation and power of armed groups in Haiti. The UN specifically mentioned Cherizier, noting his alleged role in the massacres at Grand Ravine in 2017 and La Saline in 2018, and myriad other abuses since.
Local rights organizations have also denounced the formation of the G9, and have alleged that the alliance is part of a government plan to consolidate control in the densely populated capital ahead of yet-to-be-scheduled elections. Cherizier has denied he is working with the Moïse administration. The Post continued:
But for his long-suffering countrymen, Cherizier’s G9 is evoking the horrors of the Tontons Macoutes, the government-backed paramilitaries that terrorized Haiti for decades under dictator François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude.
“The government has said nothing about [Cherizier’s rise], and the international community has turned a blind eye,” said Pierre Espérance, director of Haiti’s National Human Rights Defense Network. “There is no rule of law anymore. The gangs are the new Macoutes. It feels like there is a manifest will to install a new dictatorship.”
US Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-CA) has condemned Cherizier and the government’s inaction, pointing the finger at the Trump administration’s unconditional support for the Haitian government. “There is no real concern for the plight of the Haitians, whether they are being beaten and killed by the president of Haiti,” she told The Post. “As long as the president is in our pockets, everything is okay.”
Michele Sison, the US ambassador to Haiti, pushed back. “Rather than pointing fingers,” she told The Post, “our point is to encourage all actors . . . to think about the most vulnerable who continue to bear the brunt of these challenges.”
In a recent report, the National Human Rights Defense Network reported that at least 111 civilians had been killed in gang violence in Cité Soleil in June and July. The December 2019 arrest of Larco, meanwhile, has done little to stem the illegal flow of weapons. In recent weeks, witnesses have seen armed civilians in Cité Soleil carrying automatic weapons that appear to bear the trademark of Carl Martin’s handiwork, raising the possibility that, willingly or not, his guns may be making their way into the hands of civilians. But even as allegations of rights abuses — and police complicity — pile up, the US has deepened its support for the HNP.
Earlier this month, the State Department notified Congress that it was reallocating $8 million from last year’s budget to support the HNP. Since Trump took office, the US has nearly quadrupled its support to Haiti’s police — from $2.8 million in 2016 to more than $12.4 million last year. With the recent reallocation, the figure this year will likely be even higher. US funding for the Haitian police constitutes more than 10 percent of the institution’s overall budget.
The HNP, which recently celebrated its 25th anniversary, has been chronically underfunded, and many officers do not even receive regular paychecks. But, in the current environment, ramped up US support for the police is unlikely to improve the rapidly devolving security situation. Rather, continued diplomatic and financial support from the Trump administration is likely to only harden the corrupt networks that perpetuate insecurity — with potentially deadly political consequences. The State Department award to X-International makes up only a small portion of overall US support to the police, but nevertheless, it is emblematic of the various ways US assistance empowers Haiti’s status quo.
• HaitiHaitiLatin America and the CaribbeanAmérica Latina y el CaribeUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
Haitian president Jovenel Moïse, governing without parliament after terms expired in January without new elections taking place, is facing increasing questions over when, exactly, his own presidential mandate ends. Moïse assumed the presidency after 2015 presidential elections, which had to be rerun after the discovery of widespread irregularities that undermined the credibility of the vote. That fraught electoral process delayed Moïse’s inauguration by a year; now the question has become if that year counts toward the president’s five-year mandate.
On Friday, May 29, the office of Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General Luis Almagro issued a press release taking a stand on the question of Moïse’s mandate, saying:
The OAS General Secretariat urges all political forces in Haiti to find a cooperative framework in order to comply with the letter and the spirit of their constitutional order, respecting the five-year presidential term in office. In this context, the term of President Jovenel Moïse ends on February 7, 2022.
Amid a domestic political crisis, the OAS’ comments amount to an intervention in the affairs of a member country, which goes against the institution’s own charter. “The Organization of American States has no powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by this Charter, none of whose provisions authorizes it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the Member States,” Article I of the charter reads. It would be difficult to argue that issues of constitutional interpretation are anything other than the “internal jurisdiction of member states.”
The OAS press release follows an open letter to Almagro from Edmonde Supplice Beauzile, the head of Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats, a centrist Haitian political party. After outlining a history of perceived antidemocratic abuses on the part on the Moïse administration, Beauzile noted that Moïse “is engaged in an all-out campaign” to extend his term to 2022 and expressed her “hope that the regional organization which has distinguished itself in the recent past by applying its seal of approval on at least questionable elections, will not agree to support an apprentice dictator who has demonstrated the little respect he has for the constitution, the rule of law and democracy.”
On June 2, seven Haitian human rights organizations sent a letter to Almagro, condemning his remarks as contrary to the OAS charter and detailing their legal interpretation of the presidential mandate. “President Moïse cannot determine the duration of his term of office, in the same way that the Secretary General himself could not define his own mandate according to his interpretation of the OAS Charter,” the organizations wrote.
“There is no doubt,” the groups write, “that the mandate of President Jovenel Moïse ends on February 7, 2021.”
Questions over Moïse’s mandate stem from the 2015/2016 electoral process, but the OAS’ role in that process, and its previous intervention in the 2010 election, is now undermining the institution’s ability to play a helpful role in the current political crisis.
On election day in 2010, the Core Group in Haiti — which includes the OAS — attempted to force then president René Préval into accepting a plane to take him into exile. The election was marred by significant irregularities — including that more than 10 percent of the vote was never counted. Nevertheless, the OAS initially backed the legitimacy of the vote. Eventually, however, the OAS sent an “expert mission” to analyze the poll returns after Préval’s chosen successor appeared headed to a runoff. The OAS mission, without performing a full recount or even conducting a statistical analysis of the missing votes, recommended overturning the results of the election and placing the third-place finisher, Michel Martelly, into the runoff election at the expense of Préval’s successor.
The brazen intervention, backed up by threats of aid cutoffs and visa sanctions, has inextricably tied the fate of the OAS in Haiti with Martelly and his political party, Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK). The 2015/2016 electoral process did little to dispel those concerns.
The 2015 elections were the first elections held under the Martelly administration — and, similar to today’s situation, only took place after the terms of parliament expired and Martelly was ruling by decree. (The Haitian constitution does not actually allow presidents to rule-by-decree.) The OAS provided funding and technical support for the election, and then sent an observer mission to monitor the vote.
Despite reports from local observer groups that the election had been marred by widespread irregularities, the OAS observer mission provided the results with its stamp of approval. Opposition parties pledged to boycott the runoff vote, and, under increasing pressure from street protests, the electoral council postponed the election. The OAS eventually acquiesced to Haitian demands for an audit of the vote, and even sent a special mission to negotiate the end of Martelly’s mandate in early 2016 — which paved the way for a transitional government, an audit of the vote, and a do-over election in November 2016. Notably, the rerun election was held under the same electoral law and without reopening candidate registrations.
The negotiated end of Martelly’s mandate actually provides a precedenct in the current crisis, the seven human rights organizations argue. The beginning of Martelly’s mandate was delayed a number of months by the 2010 electoral fracas, nevertheless, Martelly left office on February 7, 2016 — months before he hit five years. (Notably, former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was not allowed to serve his full first term after returning to the presidency in 1994. This followed the 1991 coup d’etat that saw Aristide deposed and exiled for a total of three years.)
In their letter to Almagro, the seven organizations point out that Martelly himself acknowledged this in his parting speech. “[M]y mandate is nearing its end,” Martelly said at the time. “According to Article 134-1 of the Mother Law, the presidential term is five (5) years. This period begins and ends on February 7 of the fifth year of the mandate, regardless of the start date.”
The key question facing Haiti now is: when did the constitutional mandate of the president actually begin? The Moïse administration has argued the constitution is clear — and confers a president with a five-year mandate. If Moïse took office in February 2017, his term should therefore conclude in February 2022. The rights organizations, however, contend that Moïse should not be able to benefit from the fraud-pocked election which had to be reheld. The constitution, they argue, is clear that the presidential mandate begins following the election — meaning that, constitutionally, the mandate began in February 2016, following the October 2015 vote, and will end in 2021, regardless of when the president himself took office.
The rights organizations also point to the 2015 electoral law, which notes that, if the election is not held in the constitutional timetable, “The term of office of the President of the Republic shall end on the seventh (7th) of February in the fifth year of his term of office, regardless of the date of his entry into office.”
Further, the organizations point to the recent expiration of parliaments’ terms as an additional precedent. On January 13, in a tweet, President Moïse declared the terms of parliament complete. However, as the organizations note, some deputies and senators had not completed their full mandate. “As the legislature ended on the second Monday of January 2020, all Congressman, regardless of the year in which they took office, left Parliament.”
The focus on a constitutional interpretation, however, obscures a deeper issue. No election has been held under the Moïse administration, no elections are scheduled, and there is no functioning parliament to serve as a check on the presidency.
Last week, the Haitian government requested support from the OAS in organizing elections this year, but opposition politicians — emboldened by nearly two years of popular frustration and protests against the Moïse administration and government corruption — have shown little willingness to participate in elections organized by the current government.
For much of the past two years, the donor community, including the OAS, has advocated for dialogue — a political negotiation to reach agreement around elections, mandates, and governance. Regardless of when exactly the president’s term ends, it has become clear that the only way forward will be through a broad, consensual, and Haitian-led political accord. Allowing Moïse to stay in office until 2022 without addressing the other, related, political issues such as elections, will only serve to kick the can down the road. The statement from the OAS Secretary General won’t help in the slightest, and will only further prove to Haiti’s opposition that the OAS is serving as an overt political actor in Haiti as opposed to a neutral arbiter.
The relationship between President Moïse and the OAS and Secretary General Almagro has deepened in recent years. In January 2019, Haiti sided with the United States and voted at the OAS to condemn the Maduro government in Venezuela and recognize the Juan Guaidó “administration.” In doing so, Haiti broke from the majority of CARICOM countries, which have long voted as a bloc — especially in matters of concern to national sovereignty.
Moïse, at the time, was facing his own internal political crisis over his role in the Petrocaribe corruption scandal; his government’s acquiescence to the interests of Washington and Almagro proved useful in ensuring his own political survival. In the fall of 2018, #KoteKobPetrokaribeA? (where is the Petrocaribe money?) began trending on social media, and in the streets of Haiti. The protest movement was given new impetus in the spring of 2019 when government auditors released a lengthy investigation into Petrocaribe, revealing that multiple companies owned by President Moïse had received government money for work that was never completed.
In June, Carlos Trujillo, the US ambassador to the OAS, led a “fact-finding” delegation to Haiti. An anonymous official on the trip told the Miami Herald that the OAS was prepared to assist in the PetroCaribe scandal and help determine who should face prosecution. Moïse, the official continued, “said he was ready to go to Washington and sign. He said he has nothing to hide.”
“This shows a willingness by the OAS to impose a solution without listening to the popular demands of the population,” Nou Pap Domi, an anticorruption collective, said in response. “[But] we at Nou Pap Domi are committed to finding a solution to Haiti with Haitians.”
“The presence of the OAS does not change our position,” the collective added. “But we wrote the OAS on June 8, 2019, to inform them that we do not recognize the legitimacy of President Jovenel Moïse and we have no trust in him leading the country because he has serious allegations that involve corruption.”
Moïse, facing calls for his resignation, continued to point to the OAS’ work. In July, he wrote in a Miami Herald opinion piece that he was “working with the [OAS] to assemble a team of independent international financial experts for a commission that will work around our broken politics to deliver a fair, credible, objective audit so that Haitian judges can pursue accountability for anyone found to have committed crimes and stolen from the Haitian people.”
But, while the OAS has since begun raising funds for an anticorruption program in Haiti, it was never meant to investigate Petrocaribe. It was later revealed by Antigua and Barbuda’s ambassador to the OAS, Sir Ronald Sanders (who led the OAS team that negotiated Martelly’s exit from office), that Trujillo’s “fact-finding” mission was not actually on behalf of the entire organization, but just on his own behalf as acting president of the OAS Permanent Council. Progress on the Petrocaribe dossier has stalled, and Moïse has remained in office.
While the OAS has now offered its own constitutional interpretation of Moïse’s mandate, it remained alarmingly silent when the terms of parliament expired in January 2020. In fact, Almagro personally traveled to Haiti on January 7, just days before. The expiration of parliament’s terms represented a possible break in Haiti’s democratic order, and there was concern that some countries could push the OAS to invoke the democratic charter against the Moïse administration (as Moïse had helped the OAS do to Venezuela the year prior).
Almagro, however, was in the midst of his own political fight — competing for reelection as secretary general and looking to ensure support throughout the region. The two leaders needed one another. If the quid pro quo wasn’t explicit during the two leader’s conversations, Almagro’s public comments spoke for themselves.
“Today I reiterated to President @Moïsejovenel our staunch support for good governance & political stability in #Haiti, which includes reaching a political agreement, promoting constant and inclusive dialogue,” the Secretary General tweeted. He made no reference to the fact that the president would be in office without a functioning parliament in just five days’ time.
Over the previous decade, OAS leadership has tied itself to successive PHTK governments in Haiti. As the Haitian government once again calls in OAS support, few Haitians will forget the manner in which that relationship was forged, nor are they likely to see the OAS as an institution capable of facilitating an exit to the current political crisis — which in many ways stems from the OAS intervention ten years ago.
Haitian president Jovenel Moïse, governing without parliament after terms expired in January without new elections taking place, is facing increasing questions over when, exactly, his own presidential mandate ends. Moïse assumed the presidency after 2015 presidential elections, which had to be rerun after the discovery of widespread irregularities that undermined the credibility of the vote. That fraught electoral process delayed Moïse’s inauguration by a year; now the question has become if that year counts toward the president’s five-year mandate.
On Friday, May 29, the office of Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General Luis Almagro issued a press release taking a stand on the question of Moïse’s mandate, saying:
The OAS General Secretariat urges all political forces in Haiti to find a cooperative framework in order to comply with the letter and the spirit of their constitutional order, respecting the five-year presidential term in office. In this context, the term of President Jovenel Moïse ends on February 7, 2022.
Amid a domestic political crisis, the OAS’ comments amount to an intervention in the affairs of a member country, which goes against the institution’s own charter. “The Organization of American States has no powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by this Charter, none of whose provisions authorizes it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the Member States,” Article I of the charter reads. It would be difficult to argue that issues of constitutional interpretation are anything other than the “internal jurisdiction of member states.”
The OAS press release follows an open letter to Almagro from Edmonde Supplice Beauzile, the head of Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats, a centrist Haitian political party. After outlining a history of perceived antidemocratic abuses on the part on the Moïse administration, Beauzile noted that Moïse “is engaged in an all-out campaign” to extend his term to 2022 and expressed her “hope that the regional organization which has distinguished itself in the recent past by applying its seal of approval on at least questionable elections, will not agree to support an apprentice dictator who has demonstrated the little respect he has for the constitution, the rule of law and democracy.”
On June 2, seven Haitian human rights organizations sent a letter to Almagro, condemning his remarks as contrary to the OAS charter and detailing their legal interpretation of the presidential mandate. “President Moïse cannot determine the duration of his term of office, in the same way that the Secretary General himself could not define his own mandate according to his interpretation of the OAS Charter,” the organizations wrote.
“There is no doubt,” the groups write, “that the mandate of President Jovenel Moïse ends on February 7, 2021.”
Questions over Moïse’s mandate stem from the 2015/2016 electoral process, but the OAS’ role in that process, and its previous intervention in the 2010 election, is now undermining the institution’s ability to play a helpful role in the current political crisis.
On election day in 2010, the Core Group in Haiti — which includes the OAS — attempted to force then president René Préval into accepting a plane to take him into exile. The election was marred by significant irregularities — including that more than 10 percent of the vote was never counted. Nevertheless, the OAS initially backed the legitimacy of the vote. Eventually, however, the OAS sent an “expert mission” to analyze the poll returns after Préval’s chosen successor appeared headed to a runoff. The OAS mission, without performing a full recount or even conducting a statistical analysis of the missing votes, recommended overturning the results of the election and placing the third-place finisher, Michel Martelly, into the runoff election at the expense of Préval’s successor.
The brazen intervention, backed up by threats of aid cutoffs and visa sanctions, has inextricably tied the fate of the OAS in Haiti with Martelly and his political party, Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK). The 2015/2016 electoral process did little to dispel those concerns.
The 2015 elections were the first elections held under the Martelly administration — and, similar to today’s situation, only took place after the terms of parliament expired and Martelly was ruling by decree. (The Haitian constitution does not actually allow presidents to rule-by-decree.) The OAS provided funding and technical support for the election, and then sent an observer mission to monitor the vote.
Despite reports from local observer groups that the election had been marred by widespread irregularities, the OAS observer mission provided the results with its stamp of approval. Opposition parties pledged to boycott the runoff vote, and, under increasing pressure from street protests, the electoral council postponed the election. The OAS eventually acquiesced to Haitian demands for an audit of the vote, and even sent a special mission to negotiate the end of Martelly’s mandate in early 2016 — which paved the way for a transitional government, an audit of the vote, and a do-over election in November 2016. Notably, the rerun election was held under the same electoral law and without reopening candidate registrations.
The negotiated end of Martelly’s mandate actually provides a precedenct in the current crisis, the seven human rights organizations argue. The beginning of Martelly’s mandate was delayed a number of months by the 2010 electoral fracas, nevertheless, Martelly left office on February 7, 2016 — months before he hit five years. (Notably, former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was not allowed to serve his full first term after returning to the presidency in 1994. This followed the 1991 coup d’etat that saw Aristide deposed and exiled for a total of three years.)
In their letter to Almagro, the seven organizations point out that Martelly himself acknowledged this in his parting speech. “[M]y mandate is nearing its end,” Martelly said at the time. “According to Article 134-1 of the Mother Law, the presidential term is five (5) years. This period begins and ends on February 7 of the fifth year of the mandate, regardless of the start date.”
The key question facing Haiti now is: when did the constitutional mandate of the president actually begin? The Moïse administration has argued the constitution is clear — and confers a president with a five-year mandate. If Moïse took office in February 2017, his term should therefore conclude in February 2022. The rights organizations, however, contend that Moïse should not be able to benefit from the fraud-pocked election which had to be reheld. The constitution, they argue, is clear that the presidential mandate begins following the election — meaning that, constitutionally, the mandate began in February 2016, following the October 2015 vote, and will end in 2021, regardless of when the president himself took office.
The rights organizations also point to the 2015 electoral law, which notes that, if the election is not held in the constitutional timetable, “The term of office of the President of the Republic shall end on the seventh (7th) of February in the fifth year of his term of office, regardless of the date of his entry into office.”
Further, the organizations point to the recent expiration of parliaments’ terms as an additional precedent. On January 13, in a tweet, President Moïse declared the terms of parliament complete. However, as the organizations note, some deputies and senators had not completed their full mandate. “As the legislature ended on the second Monday of January 2020, all Congressman, regardless of the year in which they took office, left Parliament.”
The focus on a constitutional interpretation, however, obscures a deeper issue. No election has been held under the Moïse administration, no elections are scheduled, and there is no functioning parliament to serve as a check on the presidency.
Last week, the Haitian government requested support from the OAS in organizing elections this year, but opposition politicians — emboldened by nearly two years of popular frustration and protests against the Moïse administration and government corruption — have shown little willingness to participate in elections organized by the current government.
For much of the past two years, the donor community, including the OAS, has advocated for dialogue — a political negotiation to reach agreement around elections, mandates, and governance. Regardless of when exactly the president’s term ends, it has become clear that the only way forward will be through a broad, consensual, and Haitian-led political accord. Allowing Moïse to stay in office until 2022 without addressing the other, related, political issues such as elections, will only serve to kick the can down the road. The statement from the OAS Secretary General won’t help in the slightest, and will only further prove to Haiti’s opposition that the OAS is serving as an overt political actor in Haiti as opposed to a neutral arbiter.
The relationship between President Moïse and the OAS and Secretary General Almagro has deepened in recent years. In January 2019, Haiti sided with the United States and voted at the OAS to condemn the Maduro government in Venezuela and recognize the Juan Guaidó “administration.” In doing so, Haiti broke from the majority of CARICOM countries, which have long voted as a bloc — especially in matters of concern to national sovereignty.
Moïse, at the time, was facing his own internal political crisis over his role in the Petrocaribe corruption scandal; his government’s acquiescence to the interests of Washington and Almagro proved useful in ensuring his own political survival. In the fall of 2018, #KoteKobPetrokaribeA? (where is the Petrocaribe money?) began trending on social media, and in the streets of Haiti. The protest movement was given new impetus in the spring of 2019 when government auditors released a lengthy investigation into Petrocaribe, revealing that multiple companies owned by President Moïse had received government money for work that was never completed.
In June, Carlos Trujillo, the US ambassador to the OAS, led a “fact-finding” delegation to Haiti. An anonymous official on the trip told the Miami Herald that the OAS was prepared to assist in the PetroCaribe scandal and help determine who should face prosecution. Moïse, the official continued, “said he was ready to go to Washington and sign. He said he has nothing to hide.”
“This shows a willingness by the OAS to impose a solution without listening to the popular demands of the population,” Nou Pap Domi, an anticorruption collective, said in response. “[But] we at Nou Pap Domi are committed to finding a solution to Haiti with Haitians.”
“The presence of the OAS does not change our position,” the collective added. “But we wrote the OAS on June 8, 2019, to inform them that we do not recognize the legitimacy of President Jovenel Moïse and we have no trust in him leading the country because he has serious allegations that involve corruption.”
Moïse, facing calls for his resignation, continued to point to the OAS’ work. In July, he wrote in a Miami Herald opinion piece that he was “working with the [OAS] to assemble a team of independent international financial experts for a commission that will work around our broken politics to deliver a fair, credible, objective audit so that Haitian judges can pursue accountability for anyone found to have committed crimes and stolen from the Haitian people.”
But, while the OAS has since begun raising funds for an anticorruption program in Haiti, it was never meant to investigate Petrocaribe. It was later revealed by Antigua and Barbuda’s ambassador to the OAS, Sir Ronald Sanders (who led the OAS team that negotiated Martelly’s exit from office), that Trujillo’s “fact-finding” mission was not actually on behalf of the entire organization, but just on his own behalf as acting president of the OAS Permanent Council. Progress on the Petrocaribe dossier has stalled, and Moïse has remained in office.
While the OAS has now offered its own constitutional interpretation of Moïse’s mandate, it remained alarmingly silent when the terms of parliament expired in January 2020. In fact, Almagro personally traveled to Haiti on January 7, just days before. The expiration of parliament’s terms represented a possible break in Haiti’s democratic order, and there was concern that some countries could push the OAS to invoke the democratic charter against the Moïse administration (as Moïse had helped the OAS do to Venezuela the year prior).
Almagro, however, was in the midst of his own political fight — competing for reelection as secretary general and looking to ensure support throughout the region. The two leaders needed one another. If the quid pro quo wasn’t explicit during the two leader’s conversations, Almagro’s public comments spoke for themselves.
“Today I reiterated to President @Moïsejovenel our staunch support for good governance & political stability in #Haiti, which includes reaching a political agreement, promoting constant and inclusive dialogue,” the Secretary General tweeted. He made no reference to the fact that the president would be in office without a functioning parliament in just five days’ time.
Over the previous decade, OAS leadership has tied itself to successive PHTK governments in Haiti. As the Haitian government once again calls in OAS support, few Haitians will forget the manner in which that relationship was forged, nor are they likely to see the OAS as an institution capable of facilitating an exit to the current political crisis — which in many ways stems from the OAS intervention ten years ago.
• HaitiHaitiUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
The following post is a guest submission from Marc J. Cohen and Tonny Joseph.
Breakfast in Haiti typically includes manba, the local peanut butter. Unlike the smooth or chunky product found in the United States, it frequently includes a kick from chili peppers!
Haitian peanut butter stands out in another way. In a country where 60% of the food supply—and 80% or more of the rice—comes from abroad, most of the manba is processed locally from Haitian-grown peanuts. Though few Haitian farmers make their living entirely from peanuts, they represent an important income stream, particularly as they can resist the punishing droughts that Haiti has faced over the past few years. For low-income rural women, earnings from artisanal processing of peanut butter and peanut brittle, and from selling unshelled peanuts or peanut-based candy and pastry, mean a degree of economic empowerment and the ability to contribute to family expenses such as school fees and healthcare costs, as well as food.
Two US NGOs, Meds & Food for Kids (MFK) and Partners in Health, work with Haitian farmers to obtain peanuts used to produce ready-to-use foods for treating acutely malnourished children. MFK calls its product “medika manba.”
The US government has provided substantial support to Haiti’s peanut production. Through the Feed the Future Initiative and other channels, US aid has helped boost Haitian peanut growers’ productivity and assisted them in harvesting goobers free from aflatoxin, a carcinogenic mold that is a major problem affecting Haitian peanuts.
So far, this sounds like a pretty positive story. But things took a nasty turn in 2016. In March of that year, the US Department of Agriculture announced what it called a “humanitarian” donation of 500 metric tons of dry roasted US peanuts to provide snacks for 140,000 malnourished school children. For many Haitians and international advocacy groups following development issues in Haiti, this looked like surplus dumping, or, worse, an effort to pry open the Haitian peanut market at the expense of thousands of local low-income producers, processors, and traders.
As a new report by PAPDA (the Haitian Advocacy Platform for Alternative Development) and Oxfam shows, this perfectly illustrates the clash between two kinds of agriculture: small-scale farming of arid lands, subject to neoliberal policies and deprived of technical and financial support, and overdeveloped agriculture with cutting edge technology and trade protection for farmers. In the United States, 6,500 prosperous and politically well-organized peanut producers receive annual subsidies of $900 million in an exercise some observers have rightly called “naked rent seeking.” In Haiti 35,000 impoverished farmers receive no government support, generally lack organizations to represent their interests, and have only limited ability to access improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation water, or herbicides to control aflatoxin.
US peanut farmers receive much more generous subsidies than those who grow other government-supported commodities, and the government agrees to acquire their crop if the market price falls below a certain level. Even mainstream economists call these perverse incentives for overproduction “nuts.” The storage costs have led to pressures from Congress and other quarters to move the surpluses overseas as either exports or food aid. The United States is now the world’s third largest peanut exporter.
For many Haitian farmers and advocacy groups, the donation seemed like just the latest chapter in a long history of US domination of Haitian food markets. This has included US-sponsored efforts to eradicate the Haitian pig population as a preemptive strike against African Swine Fever and the US dominance of Haiti’s rice market that followed the removal of import subsidies in 1995.
Also, the 500 tons of peanuts threatened to undermine a decade of US efforts to support Haitian peanut growers. The inconsistency between US agricultural trade policy on the one hand and agricultural assistance on the other called into question the effectiveness of US aid, going against the principle known as “policy coherence for development,” which holds that donor-country policies should mutually reinforce one another in promoting development.
The PAPDA-Oxfam report recommends that the Haitian government provide significant support to the peanut value chain. It also encourages the United States and other donor-country governments to continue providing aid to Haitian peanut production, while avoiding agricultural trade policies that undermine such assistance. The paper concludes by noting that the peanut value chain in Haiti is worthy of support as it represents a reliable economic, cultural, and nutritional pillar of Haitian society.
Last week, on May 1, Haitians celebrated their annual Agriculture and Labor Day holiday. Amidst the very difficult economic, political, and social conditions Haiti is facing, now vastly complicated by the effects of the coronavirus, it would be wonderful if the country could celebrate by exercising sovereignty over this one piece of its food and agriculture system.
Marc J. Cohen is a senior researcher at Oxfam, based in Washington, DC. Tonny Joseph is a Haitian political scientist and consultant based in Pétion Ville, Haiti. They co-authored the recent PAPDA-Oxfam report with PAPDA colleagues.
The following post is a guest submission from Marc J. Cohen and Tonny Joseph.
Breakfast in Haiti typically includes manba, the local peanut butter. Unlike the smooth or chunky product found in the United States, it frequently includes a kick from chili peppers!
Haitian peanut butter stands out in another way. In a country where 60% of the food supply—and 80% or more of the rice—comes from abroad, most of the manba is processed locally from Haitian-grown peanuts. Though few Haitian farmers make their living entirely from peanuts, they represent an important income stream, particularly as they can resist the punishing droughts that Haiti has faced over the past few years. For low-income rural women, earnings from artisanal processing of peanut butter and peanut brittle, and from selling unshelled peanuts or peanut-based candy and pastry, mean a degree of economic empowerment and the ability to contribute to family expenses such as school fees and healthcare costs, as well as food.
Two US NGOs, Meds & Food for Kids (MFK) and Partners in Health, work with Haitian farmers to obtain peanuts used to produce ready-to-use foods for treating acutely malnourished children. MFK calls its product “medika manba.”
The US government has provided substantial support to Haiti’s peanut production. Through the Feed the Future Initiative and other channels, US aid has helped boost Haitian peanut growers’ productivity and assisted them in harvesting goobers free from aflatoxin, a carcinogenic mold that is a major problem affecting Haitian peanuts.
So far, this sounds like a pretty positive story. But things took a nasty turn in 2016. In March of that year, the US Department of Agriculture announced what it called a “humanitarian” donation of 500 metric tons of dry roasted US peanuts to provide snacks for 140,000 malnourished school children. For many Haitians and international advocacy groups following development issues in Haiti, this looked like surplus dumping, or, worse, an effort to pry open the Haitian peanut market at the expense of thousands of local low-income producers, processors, and traders.
As a new report by PAPDA (the Haitian Advocacy Platform for Alternative Development) and Oxfam shows, this perfectly illustrates the clash between two kinds of agriculture: small-scale farming of arid lands, subject to neoliberal policies and deprived of technical and financial support, and overdeveloped agriculture with cutting edge technology and trade protection for farmers. In the United States, 6,500 prosperous and politically well-organized peanut producers receive annual subsidies of $900 million in an exercise some observers have rightly called “naked rent seeking.” In Haiti 35,000 impoverished farmers receive no government support, generally lack organizations to represent their interests, and have only limited ability to access improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation water, or herbicides to control aflatoxin.
US peanut farmers receive much more generous subsidies than those who grow other government-supported commodities, and the government agrees to acquire their crop if the market price falls below a certain level. Even mainstream economists call these perverse incentives for overproduction “nuts.” The storage costs have led to pressures from Congress and other quarters to move the surpluses overseas as either exports or food aid. The United States is now the world’s third largest peanut exporter.
For many Haitian farmers and advocacy groups, the donation seemed like just the latest chapter in a long history of US domination of Haitian food markets. This has included US-sponsored efforts to eradicate the Haitian pig population as a preemptive strike against African Swine Fever and the US dominance of Haiti’s rice market that followed the removal of import subsidies in 1995.
Also, the 500 tons of peanuts threatened to undermine a decade of US efforts to support Haitian peanut growers. The inconsistency between US agricultural trade policy on the one hand and agricultural assistance on the other called into question the effectiveness of US aid, going against the principle known as “policy coherence for development,” which holds that donor-country policies should mutually reinforce one another in promoting development.
The PAPDA-Oxfam report recommends that the Haitian government provide significant support to the peanut value chain. It also encourages the United States and other donor-country governments to continue providing aid to Haitian peanut production, while avoiding agricultural trade policies that undermine such assistance. The paper concludes by noting that the peanut value chain in Haiti is worthy of support as it represents a reliable economic, cultural, and nutritional pillar of Haitian society.
Last week, on May 1, Haitians celebrated their annual Agriculture and Labor Day holiday. Amidst the very difficult economic, political, and social conditions Haiti is facing, now vastly complicated by the effects of the coronavirus, it would be wonderful if the country could celebrate by exercising sovereignty over this one piece of its food and agriculture system.
Marc J. Cohen is a senior researcher at Oxfam, based in Washington, DC. Tonny Joseph is a Haitian political scientist and consultant based in Pétion Ville, Haiti. They co-authored the recent PAPDA-Oxfam report with PAPDA colleagues.
• COVID-19CoronavirusHaitiHaitiUS Foreign PolicyPolítica exterior de EE. UU.
[Editor’s Note: The day after publication, the Miami Herald reported that Emmanuel Constant had been removed from the deportation flight. An updated version of the article, in Haitian Kreyòl, was published by Ayibopost.]
As the COVID-19 pandemic has shut down borders and airports across the world, planes chartered by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) continue to fly. Every two or three weeks, a deportation flight operated by Swift Air, LLC has landed at the Port-au-Prince airport. After one such flight in early April, at least three of those deported tested positive for COVID-19. The pandemic is now sweeping through ICE detention facilities, putting the lives of tens of thousands at risk and highlighting the public health ramifications of continued deportations.
Next week, another ICE Air deportation flight is scheduled to arrive in Haiti. But the controversy will extend far beyond the health and well-being of those on board. According to a flight manifest obtained by HRRW, ICE is planning to deport Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, a former death squad leader who has been in a New York state prison for the past 12 years on grand larceny and mortgage fraud charges. Constant is listed in the manifest as a “High Profile Removal.”
Continued deportations have presented an additional strain on an already overburdened public health system, as the Haitian government has been forced to use scarce resources to quarantine and care for the dozens who arrive every few weeks. In late April, a government-backed scientific commission supporting the country’s COVID-19 response asked president Jovenel Moïse to halt further deportations during the pandemic. Representatives of the Haitian government did not respond to a request for comment.
ICE has announced it will increase testing of deportees after pushback from regional governments but it is unclear how systematic the testing will be. ICE has stated that they would only receive about 2,000 tests per month — far below the estimated number of deportations. Nevertheless, the recent ICE changes have assuaged concerns from some countries in the region, which have been under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Trump administration to continue allowing ICE Air deportation flights. According to data compiled by CEPR, ICE has made at least 246 deportation flights since the beginning of February. After a brief respite, this week the pace of deportations has increased dramatically.
The Haitian government has pushed back on the deportations. Claude Joseph, the foreign minister, told the Miami Herald in April that he had been in communication with his counterparts in the US advocating for a moratorium on deportation flights. He said that the US had agreed to temporarily suspend the deportation of those with “criminal” backgrounds to avoid further crowding Haiti’s already overcrowded prison system. But, the US has thus far rejected an outright stop to the flights. A former Haitian government official said that there had been continued discussions around a moratorium of all flights. It appears that effort has failed.
On Monday, May 11, the next ICE Air deportation flight is scheduled to arrive in Port-au-Prince, according to the flight manifest. ICE identifies 51 of the flight’s 101 passengers as having criminal backgrounds. One of those is Constant, the 63-year old former death squad leader. ICE did not respond to a request for comment; the agency has a general policy of not commenting on future deportation flights. The flight manifest is a “tentative” list of passengers; it could still be changed before the flight.
Constant was facing up to 37 years in jail, but New York State prison records show that Constant was released to ICE custody on April 7 — 12 years after his conviction — in order to face deportation. Constant’s next parole hearing had been scheduled for August, 2020. ICE records show he is currently being held at the ICE federal detention facility in Buffalo, NY — where at least 45 of those detained have confirmed COVID-19 cases.
Sources: http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ and https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/index.
The Long Struggle for Accountability, Reignited
Constant was the former head of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a paramilitary organization that was responsible for the extrajudicial killing of an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Haitians in the aftermath of the 1991 military coup — as well as thousands of incidents of rape, torture, and arbitrary detention. Constant, it was later revealed, was on the CIA payroll during this period.
Upon the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in late 1994, Constant left Haiti and settled in the New York City area. In 2000, a Haitian court convicted Constant and 14 others in absentia for their involvement in a 1994 massacre in the small town of Raboteau. A civil action resulted in a $140 million award to victims’ families. In 2005, following the second ouster of Aristide, the high court in Haiti overturned the sentences for those who had been tried in person. The judgement against Constant remains valid, however, according to human rights organizations.
US courts have also recognized Constant’s responsibility for crimes against humanity, however. On behalf of three Haitian women who had been terrorized by Constant, the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) brought a civil case against Constant in 2004 and eventually won a $19 million civil judgment. Constant appealed the ruling, but the judgment was upheld by a federal court in 2009.
Separately, in 2008, Constant was convicted on charges of grand larceny and mortgage fraud in New York State Court and sentenced to 12 to 37 years. He remained in state prison until last month, when he was quietly released to ICE custody. In 2016, when Constant was up for parole, lawyers with CCR and CJA wrote to the New York State Parole Board cautioning against such a release: “If Constant were released from incarceration in New York, he would pose a serious flight risk, and might return to Haiti to exploit the tense situation to his political advantage.”
Now, the Trump administration is putting Constant on an ICE Air deportation flight direct to Haiti. But it remains unclear what will await the former CIA-backed death squad leader upon his arrival.
“If Constant is, indeed, deported to Haiti next week, the obligations of the Haitian criminal justice system are clear,” said Mario Joseph. The state must “arrest Constant as soon as he arrives and ensure that he is held accountable to the people of Haiti.” Joseph, a prominent Haitian human rights lawyer with the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), was the lawyer who secured the guilty verdict in the Raboteau Massacre case on behalf of victims’ families. Twenty years later, however, the struggle for justice and accountability remains as distant as ever.
Constant, Joseph said, could either accept the existing judgment against him or demand a new trial as he had been tried in absentia. Joseph noted, however, that Haiti’s justice system has allowed others convicted in the Raboteau Massacre to go free, including Jean Robert Gabriel, who the Haitian government appointed to the high command of the reconstituted Haitian armed forces in 2018. Joseph added that Constant had fled Haiti in 1994 precisely to avoid accountability for his heinous crimes and that the US had failed to execute a judicial order requiring his return to Haiti at the time of the Raboteau trial.
“As with the Raboteau trials, which no one thought could be successfully prosecuted at the time, BAI will continue to advocate for justice for Constant’s victims,” Joseph said. “The law of Haiti is clear on what must happen next. It is my hope that the Haitian government lives up to its responsibilities.”
Constant is the most notorious among the 101 Haitians that the US intends to deport next week, and the case most fraught with political implications. But there will be 100 others, including 50 who may be facing further jail time back in their native Haiti. The Haitian government has thus far been using hotels in the capital to quarantine those who arrive via Swift Air flights every few weeks. It has provided meals and pledged medical support to deportees, but it is unclear what it will do with those facing criminal charges.
In 2019, Haiti’s prison occupancy rate was 358 percent — the jails are notoriously and chronically overcrowded, holding three-and-a-half times as many as they should be. The pandemic has shone fresh light at the horrid conditions of prisons — including in the US, where COVID-19 is spreading far faster among the prison population than among the general public. Governments across the globe, including in Haiti, are under pressure to remove people from prisons as a matter of public health. From March 19, when Haiti declared a national emergency, to April 15, at least 459 prisoners were released in Haiti, according to the National Human Rights Defense Network.
“Given the inhumane conditions and overcrowding in Haiti’s prisons, it is important the government release those detained — especially the large number of individuals who have never faced a judge and have been held indefinitely while facing only minor charges,” said Rosy Auguste of the National Network for Human Rights Organizations (RNDDH). Even with Haiti’s prisons overflowing, the country is facing a crisis of impunity — with those politically connected seemingly protected from justice. “Further deportations will only place additional strain on Haiti’s institutions,” Auguste added.
ICE is facing increasing pressure in the US over its continued deportations as well. Last week, 15 Senators wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf requesting a halt to deportations until ICE can ensure all deportees have been tested first. The letter followed previous efforts in the House, led by Rep. Frederica Wilson (D-FL), that had called on ICE to suspend all further deportations to Haiti amid the pandemic.
The deportation of Constant “complicates things on so many levels,” Guerline Jozef, the executive director of the Haiti Bridge Alliance, said. “We don’t know why they are deporting him now, especially understanding the current situation with Haiti’s politics.” Jozef said she is worried that Constant’s return will create even more instability, especially considering his past conviction by a Haitian court.
But for Jozef, whose organization spearheaded a letter last month from 164 organizations calling for an end to deportations during the pandemic, the bigger picture remains halting all such flights. “No matter how you look at it, continuing with deportations means continued exportation of COVID-19 throughout the region.”
[Editor’s Note: The day after publication, the Miami Herald reported that Emmanuel Constant had been removed from the deportation flight. An updated version of the article, in Haitian Kreyòl, was published by Ayibopost.]
As the COVID-19 pandemic has shut down borders and airports across the world, planes chartered by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) continue to fly. Every two or three weeks, a deportation flight operated by Swift Air, LLC has landed at the Port-au-Prince airport. After one such flight in early April, at least three of those deported tested positive for COVID-19. The pandemic is now sweeping through ICE detention facilities, putting the lives of tens of thousands at risk and highlighting the public health ramifications of continued deportations.
Next week, another ICE Air deportation flight is scheduled to arrive in Haiti. But the controversy will extend far beyond the health and well-being of those on board. According to a flight manifest obtained by HRRW, ICE is planning to deport Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, a former death squad leader who has been in a New York state prison for the past 12 years on grand larceny and mortgage fraud charges. Constant is listed in the manifest as a “High Profile Removal.”
Continued deportations have presented an additional strain on an already overburdened public health system, as the Haitian government has been forced to use scarce resources to quarantine and care for the dozens who arrive every few weeks. In late April, a government-backed scientific commission supporting the country’s COVID-19 response asked president Jovenel Moïse to halt further deportations during the pandemic. Representatives of the Haitian government did not respond to a request for comment.
ICE has announced it will increase testing of deportees after pushback from regional governments but it is unclear how systematic the testing will be. ICE has stated that they would only receive about 2,000 tests per month — far below the estimated number of deportations. Nevertheless, the recent ICE changes have assuaged concerns from some countries in the region, which have been under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Trump administration to continue allowing ICE Air deportation flights. According to data compiled by CEPR, ICE has made at least 246 deportation flights since the beginning of February. After a brief respite, this week the pace of deportations has increased dramatically.
The Haitian government has pushed back on the deportations. Claude Joseph, the foreign minister, told the Miami Herald in April that he had been in communication with his counterparts in the US advocating for a moratorium on deportation flights. He said that the US had agreed to temporarily suspend the deportation of those with “criminal” backgrounds to avoid further crowding Haiti’s already overcrowded prison system. But, the US has thus far rejected an outright stop to the flights. A former Haitian government official said that there had been continued discussions around a moratorium of all flights. It appears that effort has failed.
On Monday, May 11, the next ICE Air deportation flight is scheduled to arrive in Port-au-Prince, according to the flight manifest. ICE identifies 51 of the flight’s 101 passengers as having criminal backgrounds. One of those is Constant, the 63-year old former death squad leader. ICE did not respond to a request for comment; the agency has a general policy of not commenting on future deportation flights. The flight manifest is a “tentative” list of passengers; it could still be changed before the flight.
Constant was facing up to 37 years in jail, but New York State prison records show that Constant was released to ICE custody on April 7 — 12 years after his conviction — in order to face deportation. Constant’s next parole hearing had been scheduled for August, 2020. ICE records show he is currently being held at the ICE federal detention facility in Buffalo, NY — where at least 45 of those detained have confirmed COVID-19 cases.
Sources: http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ and https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/index.
The Long Struggle for Accountability, Reignited
Constant was the former head of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a paramilitary organization that was responsible for the extrajudicial killing of an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 Haitians in the aftermath of the 1991 military coup — as well as thousands of incidents of rape, torture, and arbitrary detention. Constant, it was later revealed, was on the CIA payroll during this period.
Upon the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in late 1994, Constant left Haiti and settled in the New York City area. In 2000, a Haitian court convicted Constant and 14 others in absentia for their involvement in a 1994 massacre in the small town of Raboteau. A civil action resulted in a $140 million award to victims’ families. In 2005, following the second ouster of Aristide, the high court in Haiti overturned the sentences for those who had been tried in person. The judgement against Constant remains valid, however, according to human rights organizations.
US courts have also recognized Constant’s responsibility for crimes against humanity, however. On behalf of three Haitian women who had been terrorized by Constant, the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA) and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) brought a civil case against Constant in 2004 and eventually won a $19 million civil judgment. Constant appealed the ruling, but the judgment was upheld by a federal court in 2009.
Separately, in 2008, Constant was convicted on charges of grand larceny and mortgage fraud in New York State Court and sentenced to 12 to 37 years. He remained in state prison until last month, when he was quietly released to ICE custody. In 2016, when Constant was up for parole, lawyers with CCR and CJA wrote to the New York State Parole Board cautioning against such a release: “If Constant were released from incarceration in New York, he would pose a serious flight risk, and might return to Haiti to exploit the tense situation to his political advantage.”
Now, the Trump administration is putting Constant on an ICE Air deportation flight direct to Haiti. But it remains unclear what will await the former CIA-backed death squad leader upon his arrival.
“If Constant is, indeed, deported to Haiti next week, the obligations of the Haitian criminal justice system are clear,” said Mario Joseph. The state must “arrest Constant as soon as he arrives and ensure that he is held accountable to the people of Haiti.” Joseph, a prominent Haitian human rights lawyer with the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), was the lawyer who secured the guilty verdict in the Raboteau Massacre case on behalf of victims’ families. Twenty years later, however, the struggle for justice and accountability remains as distant as ever.
Constant, Joseph said, could either accept the existing judgment against him or demand a new trial as he had been tried in absentia. Joseph noted, however, that Haiti’s justice system has allowed others convicted in the Raboteau Massacre to go free, including Jean Robert Gabriel, who the Haitian government appointed to the high command of the reconstituted Haitian armed forces in 2018. Joseph added that Constant had fled Haiti in 1994 precisely to avoid accountability for his heinous crimes and that the US had failed to execute a judicial order requiring his return to Haiti at the time of the Raboteau trial.
“As with the Raboteau trials, which no one thought could be successfully prosecuted at the time, BAI will continue to advocate for justice for Constant’s victims,” Joseph said. “The law of Haiti is clear on what must happen next. It is my hope that the Haitian government lives up to its responsibilities.”
Constant is the most notorious among the 101 Haitians that the US intends to deport next week, and the case most fraught with political implications. But there will be 100 others, including 50 who may be facing further jail time back in their native Haiti. The Haitian government has thus far been using hotels in the capital to quarantine those who arrive via Swift Air flights every few weeks. It has provided meals and pledged medical support to deportees, but it is unclear what it will do with those facing criminal charges.
In 2019, Haiti’s prison occupancy rate was 358 percent — the jails are notoriously and chronically overcrowded, holding three-and-a-half times as many as they should be. The pandemic has shone fresh light at the horrid conditions of prisons — including in the US, where COVID-19 is spreading far faster among the prison population than among the general public. Governments across the globe, including in Haiti, are under pressure to remove people from prisons as a matter of public health. From March 19, when Haiti declared a national emergency, to April 15, at least 459 prisoners were released in Haiti, according to the National Human Rights Defense Network.
“Given the inhumane conditions and overcrowding in Haiti’s prisons, it is important the government release those detained — especially the large number of individuals who have never faced a judge and have been held indefinitely while facing only minor charges,” said Rosy Auguste of the National Network for Human Rights Organizations (RNDDH). Even with Haiti’s prisons overflowing, the country is facing a crisis of impunity — with those politically connected seemingly protected from justice. “Further deportations will only place additional strain on Haiti’s institutions,” Auguste added.
ICE is facing increasing pressure in the US over its continued deportations as well. Last week, 15 Senators wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf requesting a halt to deportations until ICE can ensure all deportees have been tested first. The letter followed previous efforts in the House, led by Rep. Frederica Wilson (D-FL), that had called on ICE to suspend all further deportations to Haiti amid the pandemic.
The deportation of Constant “complicates things on so many levels,” Guerline Jozef, the executive director of the Haiti Bridge Alliance, said. “We don’t know why they are deporting him now, especially understanding the current situation with Haiti’s politics.” Jozef said she is worried that Constant’s return will create even more instability, especially considering his past conviction by a Haitian court.
But for Jozef, whose organization spearheaded a letter last month from 164 organizations calling for an end to deportations during the pandemic, the bigger picture remains halting all such flights. “No matter how you look at it, continuing with deportations means continued exportation of COVID-19 throughout the region.”
Jou ki te 19 Mas la, prezidan ayisyen Jovenel Moïse te konfime 2 premye ka Kowonaviris nan peyi a. Depi lè a, nimewo a ogmante a 8. Pou li reponn a sitiyasyon an, prezidan an deklare yon eta dijans sou peyi a; li mande pou tout lekòl, faktori, legliz, peristil, ak lòt espas relijye yo fèmen; li mete entèdiksyon pou moun soti ant 8è nan aswè ak 5è nan maten, epi li fèmen fwontyè peyi a. Gouvènman anonse demach sa yo apre li te finn kanpe tout vòl kap soti nan plizyè peyi.
Premye ka ki te repòte yo te soti nan de moun ki te vwayaje nan lòt peyi. Li enpòtan pou nou note ke leta pa gen anpil kapasite pou li fè tès yo. Mèkredi 25 Mas, te gen 58 tès ki te fèt nan tout peyi a selon dènye rapò epidemyolojik yo. Ministè Sante Piblik anonse yon plan 37.2 milyon dola ameriken pou li konbat pandemi sa a. Òganizasyon lokal ak entènasyonal deja kòmanse travay sou yon repons.
Apre près 2 lane manifestasyon san repons nan men gouvènman an, sitiyasyon ekonomik Ayiti a te rann lavi a difisil pou majorite popilasyon an. Goud la pèdi valè, to a kontinye monte e gouvènman an pako jwenn mwayen pou li ogmante lajan kap fè ekonomi a mache. Gouvènman ayisyen an pa gen anpil resous fiskal ki pou ede l fè fas a pandemi Kowonaviris sa a, e fanmi ayisyen yo ki te deja ap fè fas ak lavi chè ap kontinye viv san yo pa konn sa k ap tann yo demen.
Gen plizyè fasèt ki konplete youn lot nan repons a viris la nan peyi dayiti. Youn dwe konsantre sou sistèm sante peyi a epi kapasite l pou li detekte, trete, epi kontni viris la. Lòt la dwe gade kapasite gouvènman an pou li etabli e aplike lwa ki ankouraje distans sosyal. An sa ki gen rapò ak dezyèm fasèt sa, li enpòtan pou gouvènman an konsidere kijan popilasyon ayisyèn lan viv, entèraji epi siviv, pou lwa ak desizyon gouvènman an ka efektif nan kontni viris la, pwoteje popilasyon an epi asire ke li gen aksè a byen nesesè yo.
Nan moman an, ka ki repòte yo se ka enpòte, men avèk difikilte gouvènman ayisyen an ap genyen pou li enpoze yon karantèn, gen anpil chans pou COVID-19 la gaye nan peyi a. Menm ke deklarasyon eta dijans peyi a te nesesè, fòk efò yo pa kanpe la. Fòk gouvènman an bay pèp la bourad ak sipò legal pou travayè ak pòv yo epi lajan pou sistèm sante peyi a. Nan sans sa a, kominote entènasyonal la jwe yo gwo wòl. Bank Mondyal, Fon Monetè Entènasyonal ak lòt òganizasyon devlopman entènasyonal dwe libere resous pou Ayiti ak lòt peyi k ap devlope pou yo ka byen reponn a pandemi sa a.
Sistèm sante a
Depi avan pandemi Kowonaviris la te rive Ayiti, sistèm sante peyi a te deja gen gwo difikilte. Dapre yon etid ke Research and Education Consortium for Acute Care in Haiti (REACH) fè, Ayiti posede sèlman 124 kabann swen entansif ak 64 respiratè atifisyèl pou yon popilasyon ki gen plis pase 11 milyon moun. Lòt ekspè nan sante piblik Ayiti estime chif sa yo ka pi piti. Se yon gwo pwoblèm paske anpil ayisyen antre nan kategori moun ki a gran ris pou maladi sa a.
Depi kounye a, gen rapò ki sot nan Lopital Inivèsite Deta Ayiti (HUEH) ki di pa vreman gen preparasyon ni resous pou pwoteje moun k ap travay nan lopital yo. Sa se lakòz anpil moun refize travay. HUEH te youn nan edifis ki pou te rekonstwi ak lajan devlopman entènasyonal men apre plis pase 10 lane, plan sa yo poko reyalize.
Sistèm sante Ayiti a depann anpil de aktè prive, ONG epi asistans ak don entènasyonal. Dr. Youri Louis di jounal Haitian Times la ke depi 2013, 64 pousan nan bidjè lasante Ayiti a baze sou èd entènasyonal. Nan plizyè pati nan peyi a, aksè a swen soti sèlman nan ONG ak aktè ki pa nan leta.
Nan yon sistèm ki fragmante, fòk kowòdinasyon an byen fèt. Nan sans sa a, li bon anpil ke òganizasyon nasyonal ak entènasyonal deja ap rankontre pou diskite epi kowòdone mekanis repons. Moun ki enplike nan koze lasante an Ayiti kapab kowòdone repons yo pa rapò a jan yo te reponn epidemi Kolera a, ki te simayen nan peyi a apre sòlda Nasyon Zini te entwodui l nan peyi a. Menm ke repons a epidemi Kolera a pa t bon, dènye lane sa yo wè efò ki pi byen òganize e ki mennen kèk devlopman pozitif.
Sandra Wisner ki travay nan Enstiti pou Jistis ak Demokrasi an Ayiti (IJDH) di jounal Haitian Times la ke fòk repons gouvènman an bay kominote yo plis ankadreman:
Sa vle di aksè epi asire sèvis yo disponib poi kominote yo – kidonk rann tès, trasaj, ak tretman yo disponib kote moun yo ye; asire ke sant sante yo gen resous ak ekipman nesesè, e pou moun k ap travay sou teren yo gen resous yo bezwen pou yo bay pasyan yo bon jan sèvis.
Depi tranblemanntè 12 Janvye 2010 la, Ministè Sante Piblik la te toujou youn nan enstitisyon gouvènman an ki resevwa plis don. Malgre sa, on gwo pòsyon nan asistans entènasyonal la pa rive sipòte sistèm sante peyi a. Li enpòtan pou efò k ap devlope pou fè fas a kriz sa a akse sou ranfòse sistèm sante nasyon an. Byen ke nan 10 dènye lane yo vinn gen ti amelyorasyon, depans pou sante piblik ak nasyonal pako ase e li redui anpil tou.
Nan kad batay kont COVID-19 la, gouvènman ayisyen fè apèl a peyi Kiba pou asistans li. Gouvènman an anonse ke te gen 348 profesyonel lasante Kiben nan peyi a pou ede a repons lan, anpil nan yo te deja nan peyi a nan kad asistans jeneral a lasante nan peyi a.
Ekonomi a
Byen avan Kowonaviris la rive nan peyi a, ekspè yo te deja prevwa ekonomi ayisyen an te pral redui de 1% pou chak moun an 2019. Desizyon gouvènman an pran pou li fèmen biznis pral ajoute plis difikilte ekonomik. Strès ekonomik Kowonaviris la ap afekte dyaspora a tou e li posib tou pou nou wè yon rediksyon nan lajan dyaspora a konn voye Ayiti tou, ki se yon gwo sous pou ekonomi peyi a. Ekonomi ayisyen an depann de vèsman sa yo ki yo menm ka redui pandan kominote dyaspora a fè fas a pwòp difikilte pa li ak karantèn epi biznis ki ap fèmen.
Jesyon kriz sa a ap vinn pi difisil paske ayisyen depann anpil de ekonomi enfòmèl la. 60 pousan popilasyon an viv ak mwens ke 2 dola ameriken chak jou. Malgre gouvènman an mande pou tout biznis fèmen, reyalite a se ke anpil moun depann de ekonomi enfòmèl la pou yo siviv.
Nan sans sa a, malgre anons gouvènman yo, mache ak transpò piblik kontinye fonksyone. Mank direktiv pou chofè ak pasaje yo enkyete jounalis nan peyi a. Menm si piblik la okouran de viris la, sa pa chanje anyen, popilasyon an kontinye itilize transpò piblik pou li deplase ak mache piblik pou li manje. Gen plizyè sendika transpòtasyon ki fè rekòmandasyon pou chofè yo redui kantite pasaje pou bis ak taxi pran, men malgre sa leta poko pran inisyativ klè pou li bay direktiv pou ranfòse rekòmandasyon sendika yo epi jere koze transpòtasyon an.
Pandan gouvènman an mande pou tout faktori fèmen tou, li pako klè si gouvènman an ap bay sipò finansye bay travayè yo ki pral afekte. Antèn Ouvriye, ki se yon òganizasyon ki reprezante ouvriye ki travay nan fakotri, kritike gouvènman an poutet li pap asire salè yo pandan faktori yo fèmen. Mèkredi 25 Mas, Premye Minis Joseph Jouthe te anonse ke travayè piblik ak moun ki travay nan sektè tekstil la t ap resevwa lajan pou on mwa men li pako klè kilè sa t ap rive ni ki kantite lajan leta dispoze pou inisyativ sa a.
Pou li ka asire ke kominote yo ka pran aksyon pou yo pwoteje tet yo, fòk gouvènman an kontinye bay sèvis de baz tankou aksè a manje, dlo epi kouran. Kèk peyi deja kòmanse demach ki nesesè epi ogmante depans leta nan sèvis de baz ak pwogram sosyal. Anpil nan yo priyorize sibvansyone salè travayè yo epi lòt deja kòmanse distribye manje bay moun ki depann de aktivite jounalye pou yo siviv. Byen ke resous Ayiti limite, fòk repons gouvènman an gen mezi ladan l pou bay popilasyon an yon souf ekonomik, espesyalman pou machann, ouvriye, ak ti komèsan ki depann anpil sou ekonomi enfòmèl la pou yo viv.
Malgre tou, leta ayisyen depann anpil sou lwa fiskal tankou ogmante kredi atravè bank santral epi f on ti lage sou orè peman, byen ke s on bon bagay, demach sa yo pa p gen gwo enpak sou majorite ayisyen. Si pa gen vre asistans entènasyonal, gouvènman an ka pa gen resous fiskal nesesè pou li asiste popilasyon an kòrèkteman nan kriz sa a.
Fenomèn monte pri a deja kòmanse e l ap mete plis strès sou yon popilasyon ki deja frajil. Youn nan rezon ki lakòz sa se ke chèn distribisyon manje an Ayiti repoze anpil sou manje enpòte, ki gendwa vin pi difisil pou jwenn nan sitiyasyon moman an. Pandan gouvènman an asire ke ap gen distribisyon manje, fòk li priyorize regilasyon pri manje yo tou pou yo pa monte twòp epi pwoteje moun k ap achte manje. Sa t ap on bon opòtinite pou leta envesti nan sektè agrikilti peyi a, sa t ap on rezon pou stabilize lavi agrikiltè ak machann epi yon bon opòtinite pou ranfòse pwodiskyon nasyonal.
Èd entènasyonal
Li enperatif pou nou rekonèt ke enkapasite pou leta ayisyen byen reponn a kriz sa relye a yon listwa dominasyon, okipasyon ak eksplwatasyon entènasyonal, an plis de plizyè lane move politik sou èd entènasyonal ki destabilize kapasite leta. Malgre sa, menm jan ak tranblemanntè 12 Janvye a, nou ka wè gouvènman ayisyen an pa p ka byen reponn ni jere kriz sa a san sipò kominote entènasyonal la.
Fon Monetè Entènasyonal la ak Bank Mondyal di nan yon deklarasyon ke y ap ankouraje tout “kreditè bilateral yo pou yo kanpe peman dèt peyi IDA ki mande abstansyon.” Byen ke majorite det Ayiti a konsesyonèl (prè yo akòde a to ki swa trè piti oubyen ki a zewo), sponnsò bilateral ak miltilateral ta sipoze kanpe tout koleksyon ak sèvis sou dèt pandan pandemi sa a. BID deja anonse ke yo etabli yon fasilite prè espesyal pou peyi ki enpakte nan pandemi Kowonaviris la.
Fon Monetè Entènasyonal la gen posiblite pou li bay yon vèsman san presedan bay peyi k ap devlope tankou Ayiti, gras ak yon alokasyon spesyal (an angle li rele Special Drawing Rights – SDR). FMI poko deside sou sa men se yon bagay l ap konsidere. Poutèt Ayiti gen yon ti rezèv ak on depandans sou pwodui enpòte, alokasyon sa a t ap bay leta yon bourad ki nesesè anpil.
Li trè pwobab ke si kriz la pwolonje, l ap mete plis presyon sou yon sityasyon ensekirite alimantè frajil nan peyi a. Anpil timoun depann de pwogram manje lekòl yo ki anpil fwa finanse pa òganizasyon entènasyonal. Asistans entènasyonal ap enpòtan nan asire ke gouvènman an ap ka touche kouch popilasyon ki pi vilnerab yo, men fòk aktè entènasyonal yo fè atansyon pou yo pa repete menm erè yo fè deja. Asistans manje ta sipoze ajanse pou li asire pwokiman manje lokal epi pou li sipòte pwodiksyon nasyonal.
Devlopman pandemi Kowonaviris la an Ayiti mande aksyon imedya e konsète de aktè lokal ak entènasyonal, men nan yon peyi kote echèk asistans ak entèvansyon entènasyonal evidan, fòk moun ki konsène nan repons lan fè tout sa yo kapab pou asire yon pi bon fiti pou peyi a.
Jou ki te 19 Mas la, prezidan ayisyen Jovenel Moïse te konfime 2 premye ka Kowonaviris nan peyi a. Depi lè a, nimewo a ogmante a 8. Pou li reponn a sitiyasyon an, prezidan an deklare yon eta dijans sou peyi a; li mande pou tout lekòl, faktori, legliz, peristil, ak lòt espas relijye yo fèmen; li mete entèdiksyon pou moun soti ant 8è nan aswè ak 5è nan maten, epi li fèmen fwontyè peyi a. Gouvènman anonse demach sa yo apre li te finn kanpe tout vòl kap soti nan plizyè peyi.
Premye ka ki te repòte yo te soti nan de moun ki te vwayaje nan lòt peyi. Li enpòtan pou nou note ke leta pa gen anpil kapasite pou li fè tès yo. Mèkredi 25 Mas, te gen 58 tès ki te fèt nan tout peyi a selon dènye rapò epidemyolojik yo. Ministè Sante Piblik anonse yon plan 37.2 milyon dola ameriken pou li konbat pandemi sa a. Òganizasyon lokal ak entènasyonal deja kòmanse travay sou yon repons.
Apre près 2 lane manifestasyon san repons nan men gouvènman an, sitiyasyon ekonomik Ayiti a te rann lavi a difisil pou majorite popilasyon an. Goud la pèdi valè, to a kontinye monte e gouvènman an pako jwenn mwayen pou li ogmante lajan kap fè ekonomi a mache. Gouvènman ayisyen an pa gen anpil resous fiskal ki pou ede l fè fas a pandemi Kowonaviris sa a, e fanmi ayisyen yo ki te deja ap fè fas ak lavi chè ap kontinye viv san yo pa konn sa k ap tann yo demen.
Gen plizyè fasèt ki konplete youn lot nan repons a viris la nan peyi dayiti. Youn dwe konsantre sou sistèm sante peyi a epi kapasite l pou li detekte, trete, epi kontni viris la. Lòt la dwe gade kapasite gouvènman an pou li etabli e aplike lwa ki ankouraje distans sosyal. An sa ki gen rapò ak dezyèm fasèt sa, li enpòtan pou gouvènman an konsidere kijan popilasyon ayisyèn lan viv, entèraji epi siviv, pou lwa ak desizyon gouvènman an ka efektif nan kontni viris la, pwoteje popilasyon an epi asire ke li gen aksè a byen nesesè yo.
Nan moman an, ka ki repòte yo se ka enpòte, men avèk difikilte gouvènman ayisyen an ap genyen pou li enpoze yon karantèn, gen anpil chans pou COVID-19 la gaye nan peyi a. Menm ke deklarasyon eta dijans peyi a te nesesè, fòk efò yo pa kanpe la. Fòk gouvènman an bay pèp la bourad ak sipò legal pou travayè ak pòv yo epi lajan pou sistèm sante peyi a. Nan sans sa a, kominote entènasyonal la jwe yo gwo wòl. Bank Mondyal, Fon Monetè Entènasyonal ak lòt òganizasyon devlopman entènasyonal dwe libere resous pou Ayiti ak lòt peyi k ap devlope pou yo ka byen reponn a pandemi sa a.
Sistèm sante a
Depi avan pandemi Kowonaviris la te rive Ayiti, sistèm sante peyi a te deja gen gwo difikilte. Dapre yon etid ke Research and Education Consortium for Acute Care in Haiti (REACH) fè, Ayiti posede sèlman 124 kabann swen entansif ak 64 respiratè atifisyèl pou yon popilasyon ki gen plis pase 11 milyon moun. Lòt ekspè nan sante piblik Ayiti estime chif sa yo ka pi piti. Se yon gwo pwoblèm paske anpil ayisyen antre nan kategori moun ki a gran ris pou maladi sa a.
Depi kounye a, gen rapò ki sot nan Lopital Inivèsite Deta Ayiti (HUEH) ki di pa vreman gen preparasyon ni resous pou pwoteje moun k ap travay nan lopital yo. Sa se lakòz anpil moun refize travay. HUEH te youn nan edifis ki pou te rekonstwi ak lajan devlopman entènasyonal men apre plis pase 10 lane, plan sa yo poko reyalize.
Sistèm sante Ayiti a depann anpil de aktè prive, ONG epi asistans ak don entènasyonal. Dr. Youri Louis di jounal Haitian Times la ke depi 2013, 64 pousan nan bidjè lasante Ayiti a baze sou èd entènasyonal. Nan plizyè pati nan peyi a, aksè a swen soti sèlman nan ONG ak aktè ki pa nan leta.
Nan yon sistèm ki fragmante, fòk kowòdinasyon an byen fèt. Nan sans sa a, li bon anpil ke òganizasyon nasyonal ak entènasyonal deja ap rankontre pou diskite epi kowòdone mekanis repons. Moun ki enplike nan koze lasante an Ayiti kapab kowòdone repons yo pa rapò a jan yo te reponn epidemi Kolera a, ki te simayen nan peyi a apre sòlda Nasyon Zini te entwodui l nan peyi a. Menm ke repons a epidemi Kolera a pa t bon, dènye lane sa yo wè efò ki pi byen òganize e ki mennen kèk devlopman pozitif.
Sandra Wisner ki travay nan Enstiti pou Jistis ak Demokrasi an Ayiti (IJDH) di jounal Haitian Times la ke fòk repons gouvènman an bay kominote yo plis ankadreman:
Sa vle di aksè epi asire sèvis yo disponib poi kominote yo – kidonk rann tès, trasaj, ak tretman yo disponib kote moun yo ye; asire ke sant sante yo gen resous ak ekipman nesesè, e pou moun k ap travay sou teren yo gen resous yo bezwen pou yo bay pasyan yo bon jan sèvis.
Depi tranblemanntè 12 Janvye 2010 la, Ministè Sante Piblik la te toujou youn nan enstitisyon gouvènman an ki resevwa plis don. Malgre sa, on gwo pòsyon nan asistans entènasyonal la pa rive sipòte sistèm sante peyi a. Li enpòtan pou efò k ap devlope pou fè fas a kriz sa a akse sou ranfòse sistèm sante nasyon an. Byen ke nan 10 dènye lane yo vinn gen ti amelyorasyon, depans pou sante piblik ak nasyonal pako ase e li redui anpil tou.
Nan kad batay kont COVID-19 la, gouvènman ayisyen fè apèl a peyi Kiba pou asistans li. Gouvènman an anonse ke te gen 348 profesyonel lasante Kiben nan peyi a pou ede a repons lan, anpil nan yo te deja nan peyi a nan kad asistans jeneral a lasante nan peyi a.
Ekonomi a
Byen avan Kowonaviris la rive nan peyi a, ekspè yo te deja prevwa ekonomi ayisyen an te pral redui de 1% pou chak moun an 2019. Desizyon gouvènman an pran pou li fèmen biznis pral ajoute plis difikilte ekonomik. Strès ekonomik Kowonaviris la ap afekte dyaspora a tou e li posib tou pou nou wè yon rediksyon nan lajan dyaspora a konn voye Ayiti tou, ki se yon gwo sous pou ekonomi peyi a. Ekonomi ayisyen an depann de vèsman sa yo ki yo menm ka redui pandan kominote dyaspora a fè fas a pwòp difikilte pa li ak karantèn epi biznis ki ap fèmen.
Jesyon kriz sa a ap vinn pi difisil paske ayisyen depann anpil de ekonomi enfòmèl la. 60 pousan popilasyon an viv ak mwens ke 2 dola ameriken chak jou. Malgre gouvènman an mande pou tout biznis fèmen, reyalite a se ke anpil moun depann de ekonomi enfòmèl la pou yo siviv.
Nan sans sa a, malgre anons gouvènman yo, mache ak transpò piblik kontinye fonksyone. Mank direktiv pou chofè ak pasaje yo enkyete jounalis nan peyi a. Menm si piblik la okouran de viris la, sa pa chanje anyen, popilasyon an kontinye itilize transpò piblik pou li deplase ak mache piblik pou li manje. Gen plizyè sendika transpòtasyon ki fè rekòmandasyon pou chofè yo redui kantite pasaje pou bis ak taxi pran, men malgre sa leta poko pran inisyativ klè pou li bay direktiv pou ranfòse rekòmandasyon sendika yo epi jere koze transpòtasyon an.
Pandan gouvènman an mande pou tout faktori fèmen tou, li pako klè si gouvènman an ap bay sipò finansye bay travayè yo ki pral afekte. Antèn Ouvriye, ki se yon òganizasyon ki reprezante ouvriye ki travay nan fakotri, kritike gouvènman an poutet li pap asire salè yo pandan faktori yo fèmen. Mèkredi 25 Mas, Premye Minis Joseph Jouthe te anonse ke travayè piblik ak moun ki travay nan sektè tekstil la t ap resevwa lajan pou on mwa men li pako klè kilè sa t ap rive ni ki kantite lajan leta dispoze pou inisyativ sa a.
Pou li ka asire ke kominote yo ka pran aksyon pou yo pwoteje tet yo, fòk gouvènman an kontinye bay sèvis de baz tankou aksè a manje, dlo epi kouran. Kèk peyi deja kòmanse demach ki nesesè epi ogmante depans leta nan sèvis de baz ak pwogram sosyal. Anpil nan yo priyorize sibvansyone salè travayè yo epi lòt deja kòmanse distribye manje bay moun ki depann de aktivite jounalye pou yo siviv. Byen ke resous Ayiti limite, fòk repons gouvènman an gen mezi ladan l pou bay popilasyon an yon souf ekonomik, espesyalman pou machann, ouvriye, ak ti komèsan ki depann anpil sou ekonomi enfòmèl la pou yo viv.
Malgre tou, leta ayisyen depann anpil sou lwa fiskal tankou ogmante kredi atravè bank santral epi f on ti lage sou orè peman, byen ke s on bon bagay, demach sa yo pa p gen gwo enpak sou majorite ayisyen. Si pa gen vre asistans entènasyonal, gouvènman an ka pa gen resous fiskal nesesè pou li asiste popilasyon an kòrèkteman nan kriz sa a.
Fenomèn monte pri a deja kòmanse e l ap mete plis strès sou yon popilasyon ki deja frajil. Youn nan rezon ki lakòz sa se ke chèn distribisyon manje an Ayiti repoze anpil sou manje enpòte, ki gendwa vin pi difisil pou jwenn nan sitiyasyon moman an. Pandan gouvènman an asire ke ap gen distribisyon manje, fòk li priyorize regilasyon pri manje yo tou pou yo pa monte twòp epi pwoteje moun k ap achte manje. Sa t ap on bon opòtinite pou leta envesti nan sektè agrikilti peyi a, sa t ap on rezon pou stabilize lavi agrikiltè ak machann epi yon bon opòtinite pou ranfòse pwodiskyon nasyonal.
Èd entènasyonal
Li enperatif pou nou rekonèt ke enkapasite pou leta ayisyen byen reponn a kriz sa relye a yon listwa dominasyon, okipasyon ak eksplwatasyon entènasyonal, an plis de plizyè lane move politik sou èd entènasyonal ki destabilize kapasite leta. Malgre sa, menm jan ak tranblemanntè 12 Janvye a, nou ka wè gouvènman ayisyen an pa p ka byen reponn ni jere kriz sa a san sipò kominote entènasyonal la.
Fon Monetè Entènasyonal la ak Bank Mondyal di nan yon deklarasyon ke y ap ankouraje tout “kreditè bilateral yo pou yo kanpe peman dèt peyi IDA ki mande abstansyon.” Byen ke majorite det Ayiti a konsesyonèl (prè yo akòde a to ki swa trè piti oubyen ki a zewo), sponnsò bilateral ak miltilateral ta sipoze kanpe tout koleksyon ak sèvis sou dèt pandan pandemi sa a. BID deja anonse ke yo etabli yon fasilite prè espesyal pou peyi ki enpakte nan pandemi Kowonaviris la.
Fon Monetè Entènasyonal la gen posiblite pou li bay yon vèsman san presedan bay peyi k ap devlope tankou Ayiti, gras ak yon alokasyon spesyal (an angle li rele Special Drawing Rights – SDR). FMI poko deside sou sa men se yon bagay l ap konsidere. Poutèt Ayiti gen yon ti rezèv ak on depandans sou pwodui enpòte, alokasyon sa a t ap bay leta yon bourad ki nesesè anpil.
Li trè pwobab ke si kriz la pwolonje, l ap mete plis presyon sou yon sityasyon ensekirite alimantè frajil nan peyi a. Anpil timoun depann de pwogram manje lekòl yo ki anpil fwa finanse pa òganizasyon entènasyonal. Asistans entènasyonal ap enpòtan nan asire ke gouvènman an ap ka touche kouch popilasyon ki pi vilnerab yo, men fòk aktè entènasyonal yo fè atansyon pou yo pa repete menm erè yo fè deja. Asistans manje ta sipoze ajanse pou li asire pwokiman manje lokal epi pou li sipòte pwodiksyon nasyonal.
Devlopman pandemi Kowonaviris la an Ayiti mande aksyon imedya e konsète de aktè lokal ak entènasyonal, men nan yon peyi kote echèk asistans ak entèvansyon entènasyonal evidan, fòk moun ki konsène nan repons lan fè tout sa yo kapab pou asire yon pi bon fiti pou peyi a.
